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1 
ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
 “New England was perfectly positioned for 
trade. In cod it had a product that Europe and 
European colonies wanted, and because of cod it 
had a population with spending power that was 
hungry for European products. This was what built 
Boston… Adam Smith, the eighteenth-century 
economist, singled out the New England fishery for 
praise in his seminal work on capitalism, The 
Wealth of Nations… By the eighteenth century, cod 
had lifted New England from a distant colony of 
starving settlers to an international commercial 
power. Massachusetts had elevated cod from 
commodity to fetish. The members of the ‘codfish 
aristocracy,’ those who traced their family fortunes 
to the seventeenth-century cod fisheries, had openly 
worshiped the fish as the symbol of their wealth.” 
(Kurlansky 1997: 74-79) 
 
Like so many formerly abundant fisheries, New England’s once legendary cod 
fishery was severely depleted by centuries of intensive fishing. To the shock of 
the region these prolific fish helped build, cod populations collapsed nearly two 
decades ago, with little hope of recovery. 
In November of 2006, just days before the midterm elections, the 
prestigious journal Science released a study concluding that all the commercial 
fisheries in the world will have collapsed and the world will therefore run out of 
seafood within our lifetimes (by 2048) if current trends continue (Stokstad 2006). 
This dramatic and horrifying news received only small blurbs in most American 
newspapers, and none of the politicians or pundits addressed this important news 
in their flurry of campaigning. Even as the day’s leading environmental issue, 
global warming, is becoming more prominent in the American consciousness, 
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politicians and private citizens alike remain largely unaware of the current crisis 
of the ocean. Despite lack of interest from the public and policy makers, the 
depletion of the world’s fisheries is a serious problem, and will have very serious 
environmental, social and economic consequences in the near future. 
 The ocean is so large that for most of human history we have thought of 
its resources, especially fish, as limitless. It would have been unfathomable to our 
ancestors that the ocean could be over fished. Yet, here we are, considering the 
prospect of a world without seafood. Depletion of world fisheries is an especially 
complicated issue because of its global nature: there is only one ocean, and it is 
the planet’s largest public domain (Whitty 2006:34).  
 In many ways the situation of marine fisheries is quite similar to other 
environmental problems; however, fish are rather unique as a resource. In 
addition to being highly mobile, disobeying national boundaries, and being quite 
difficult to regulate, fish are living creatures with complex biology and behaviors, 
and are integral parts of a larger, little understood ecosystem, which includes the 
humans who depend on them for their livelihoods, and often, their food supply. A 
“fishery” therefore encompasses more than just the fish themselves, including 
their environment and all the complex factors that influence their populations 
(Sneddon 2007), including humans. For the purposes of this thesis, the term 
fishery refers to fish, their ecosystem, and the people with whom their fate is 
intertwined. This is why fisheries depletion cannot be considered in quite the 
same way one might consider, say, natural gas extraction or water conflicts. As 
Thomas MacMillan explains, “overfishing is a big problem for two reasons: the 
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first is technical. Fish are a common resource because they are fugitive - in 
simplest terms, they swim vast distances and so they are never under the control 
of one resource manager. The second reason is social. Fish aren’t just part of the 
environment, they are also a crucial source of food, employment and income” 
(2003:3). The very nature of fish and fisheries then, makes overfishing an 
especially challenging, and important, environmental problem to address.  
The factors threatening fish populations vary some by region and species, 
but almost all suffer from pollution, habitat loss, and overly intensive harvesting. 
Not only have the sheer numbers of people and boats fishing the world’s oceans 
increased in the last century, the way we fish has changed dramatically. We use 
extremely advanced technology to enable us to fish every corner of the ocean, 
finding fish in areas previously safe from our fleets. We combine this technology 
with indiscriminate fishing methods like long lining and drift nets, which catch 
and kill many unintended ocean creatures (young fish, those farther down the 
food chain, mammals, endangered species), and trawling which decimates entire 
ocean habitats. For years this meant that we were catching more and more fish. 
However, despite all this technology and intensive industrial fishing, global fish 
catch peaked over ten years ago, in 1997, and has declined since then (Whitty 
2006). Aquaculture, or fish farming is often suggested as a solution, but there are 
serious environmental problems, and in some cases human health concerns, 
associated with the practice. In addition, in many cases it requires a great deal of 
ocean fish to feed the farmed fish, making this an incongruous and impractical, 
not to mention ecologically questionable, solution.  
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 Certainly, few people can honestly argue that the world’s fisheries are not 
in serious trouble (although a few representatives of the fishing industry did 
respond to the Science article with stunning statements of denial). But, the 
problem is not given a great deal of attention, even though the implications of the 
collapse of the world’s fisheries are quite serious. Besides the basic environmental 
concerns surrounding the loss of thousands of fish species, damage to oceans and 
fisheries may dramatically change the oceans’ ecology. Already threatened or 
endangered marine species that rely on the same fish humans do, like whales, 
dolphins and other marine mammals, will be pushed closer to extinction by the 
loss of their food supply. There are other, less immediately obvious ecological 
problems with the collapse of major fish species. Julia Whitty explains that, “the 
loss of big fish in the sea is more than an aesthetic loss” (Whitty 2006:40); due to 
the disappearance of large fish high on the food chain, and many in the middle as 
well, ocean ecosystems are becoming destabilized and are changing. Whitty 
points out that one ocean animal thriving in this altered environment, jellyfish, is 
becoming more and more prevalent, and causing more and more problems for 
humans every year. An ocean with fewer large edible fish, fewer charismatic 
mammals, and more jellyfish is not a pleasant thought for anyone, but it’s a reality 
we are moving closer to every year.  
However, as mentioned earlier, fisheries are not just about fish, they are 
about the people who depend on those fish too, and therefore there are many 
economic and social reasons to be concerned about fisheries decline. About one 
sixth of the world’s population, more than one billion people, depend on fish for 
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their main source of protein (Halweil 2006). Many of these people live in Third 
World countries where they do not have access to, or simply cannot afford, 
alternatives. For them this is a serious matter of survival. As for consumers in the 
US, those who can afford to are eating more seafood since our increasingly obese 
and unhealthy population is frequently reminded that fish is a very nutritionally 
valuable food. As is the case with so many other environmental problems we face, 
the impacts will be unevenly distributed; all of us will feel the impact of a global 
fisheries collapse, but those hit hardest will be the poor. Sheer desperation drives 
poor fishermen to increasingly destructive fishing methods, both to feed 
themselves and to supply fish to the wealthy (Whitty 2006:39). In industrialized 
nations like the US and Canada, certain regional cultures have historically been 
heavily reliant on fishing and seafood. Those places are suffering not only social, 
medical, and economic losses; they are also losing part of their local culture and 
identity with the disappearance of the fisheries that have sustained them for 
centuries. The loss of ocean fisheries as a source of food will deprive many in 
wealthier nations of a nutritious food that has long been an important part of 
regional diets, and, more importantly, will worsen the huge problem of hunger 
and malnutrition in poor regions.  
 The economic impact of the depletion of the world’s fisheries is already 
starting to be felt. Regions where the economy relies heavily on fishing, like 
Newfoundland, have been suffering from the collapse of fish species like cod for 
several decades. As more species and fishing grounds become depleted, the 
economies of more and more “fishing towns” are strained, from Gloucester, 
 
 
6 
Massachusetts to San Pedro, California, and from Norway to China to New 
Zealand. The first fishermen to feel the strain are those without the resources to 
purchase the expensive technological equipment now required to have any 
success in commercial fishing, but now even those with the financial means to 
keep fishing are finding it hard to catch enough fish. Of course, the international 
response has been to fish even more relentlessly, making the problem even worse. 
It is estimated that 200 million people depend directly or indirectly on fishing for 
their main source of income, and that the fishing industry contributes $80 billion 
per year to the global economy (Eilperin 2006). For those reasons, even the least 
environmentally minded policy makers, as well as those who argue that the needs 
of humans must come first, should not ignore the consequences of the collapse of 
fisheries. 
This thesis examines the depletion of marine fisheries, as a resource, from 
a geographical perspective. In chapter two I will analyze the processes that have 
lead to fisheries collapses all over the world, as well as the management 
strategies, governance structures and political and economic forces involved, all 
with the intention of dissecting this idea of overfishing. I will then discuss the 
environmental justice implications of fisheries decline. Chapter three looks at the 
collapse of cod stocks in Eastern Canada and New England in the 1990s after 
centuries of intensive fishing, dissecting the power relations that lead to it, and its 
uneven impact; a case of Third World dynamics in the heart of the First World. 
Chapter four looks at the currently stressed and possibly declining fisheries of 
West Africa in a similar light; again I will examine the power relations involved, 
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and the impact of the decline and a possible collapse. In chapter five I will review 
the social and economic consequences of the environmental problem, 
emphasizing that each of these fisheries is as much about people as it is about 
fish. I will then discuss the strong parallels between these two cases, especially in 
the processes involved, and the important differences, specifically the very 
different social impacts of declining fisheries in these settings. Chapter five will 
conclude with a discussion of what this analysis means for the future, and where 
we can go from here.  
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TWO 
OVERFISHING: A SOCIAL, POITICAL, AND ECONOMIC PROBLEM  
In discussing the depletion of fisheries worldwide, it is often forgotten that 
fisheries are as much about people as they are about fish. Most discussions 
conclude that the simple explanation of overfishing accounts for what is going on 
in coastal communities all over the world. This chapter will dissect the idea of 
overfishing and argue that it is a complex process. In the first section I will 
discuss what is at play in this commonly offered explanation and break it down 
into its political, economic, and technological components. The second section 
will argue that overfishing is an issue of environmental justice, setting up my case 
studies in the following chapters.  
 
Overfishing 
“The fisherman’s problem consists as much of 
people stealing from each other as it does of people 
stealing collectively from nature.” (McEvoy 
1986:257) 
 
 When the depletion of a fishery is discussed, the inevitable explanation we 
are offered is “overfishing,” implying that too many fishermen caught too many 
fish for too long and decimated the fish population. It is rare for overfishing to be 
examined more closely than that, at least in the mainstream media. However, the 
concept of overfishing is far more complicated; if it were simple, fish stocks 
worldwide would not be facing irreparable collapse. Overfishing is a complex 
process that can be broken down into political, economic, and technological 
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components; components which have been combining to bring serious social and 
environmental consequences to fisheries for well over a century.  
 In an article in a 1903 issue of the Journal of the Marine Biological 
Association, Dr. C.G.J. Petersen expressed concern that something many thought 
to be impossible, overfishing, was occurring in the North Sea. He recognizes 
some of the factors involved, including the damage modern bottom trawlers were 
doing to fish habitat and populations, and warns that “we cannot ignore the fact 
that over-fishing is taking place, and that we must do something if the fisherman 
is not to starve and the North Sea become a barren … fishing ground” (Petersen 
1903:592). His tone brings to mind the way global warming has been talked about 
until fairly recently, addressing skepticism, and attempting to show that this 
phenomenon is in fact happening, and that humans are causing it. Over one 
hundred years later, we all recognize that the overfishing Petersen discusses exists 
and is a serious problem, and while we may have a better grasp of what is 
happening, we are certainly no closer to resolving it.  
Concern about overfishing is nothing new in North America either. 
According to Joseph Taylor, people in the Pacific Northwest have been 
“prophesying the imminent demise of salmon for 125 years” and the region has 
spent billions of dollars trying to save their fishery (Taylor 1999:3). Worries 
about overfishing have lingered in California, on the coast of New England, as 
well as on Canada’s east coast for nearly as long. State and federal governments 
have been trying to manage these fisheries ever since, usually to little avail. Many 
North American fisheries are severely depleted and few of us consider a more 
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complicated explanation than the usual overfishing, but since there has been 
considerable concern about declining fish stocks for over a century, a simple 
explanation clearly is insufficient. Fisheries management in the US and Canada 
affects the environment and individual fishers, as well as the cities, regions, and 
economies that have historically depended on fisheries resources; those, in turn, 
affect the ways fisheries are managed. Despite the fact that concern about 
overfishing has existed in some fisheries for over a century, in most cases 
management and governance strategies have failed to properly manage the 
resource they were designed to regulate and protect, due to the fact that most 
management has been done with political and economic, not environmental, 
motivations.     
 In The Fisherman’s Problem, Arthur McEvoy looks not only at the 
interactions between ecology, society, economy, and politics, and how each 
influences the other; he also emphasizes again and again that fishery management 
and politics have, for over a century, isolated the fish both from its natural 
environment and from the industry and people that rely on it. Both the 
environment of fish, which is in itself highly variable and complex, and the 
human institutions that demand and harvest them heavily influence fish 
populations, so while isolating fish stocks from both factors makes management 
and politics infinitely simpler, this strategy fails to achieve the objective of 
actually managing the resource. McEvoy is especially critical of the theory of 
maximum sustainable yield (MSY) for its failure to consider the biology of the 
fish themselves, natural variations in their environments and populations, and, 
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most importantly, the ways fish populations respond to and change under intense 
fishing pressure. As Tim Smith reminds us, “fishes ‘cannot be understood out of 
context from the intricate system of their biological environment composed of 
their predators (including man), their competitors, and their prey’” (Smith 
1998:337).  Even though MSY was hailed as a precise and scientific model, in 
reality, predicting wild fish populations is “more like predicting the weather or the 
outcome of an election than, say, the sustainable yield of guppies from a well-
maintained aquarium” (McEvoy 1986:7). There are simply too many fluctuating, 
difficult to measure, and interconnected variables involved for fisheries 
management to be reduced to such a simple strategy, however appealing it may 
be.  
An analysis of the interaction between fisheries, societies, economies, and 
governments offers insights into the way modern western economics handles (or 
rather, often, fails to handle) environmental and social costs. Too often, 
discussions of resource economics fail to account for “social and cultural factors 
that lead people to use resources, to perceive resource problems, and to respond to 
those problems in the ways that they do” (McEvoy 1986:14). Not only is the issue 
of fisheries one that needs to be examined in more detail than the usual 
explanation of simple overfishing, it can be argued that looking at fisheries offers 
insights not only about the ecology, production, and social and legal regulation of 
fisheries, but also of society as a whole when it comes to our inability to deal with 
our environment. 
 
 
12 
 In Making Salmon Joseph Taylor takes issue with the way fishery declines 
are usually characterized as the simple result of overfishing. He argues that by 
solely blaming the fishers themselves for being greedy and fishing too much with 
no regard for the future, we lose sight of the social and economic context that 
fishers fish within. In other words, to use Taylor’s example, if there were no 
demand for salmon, no other pressures on the salmon population, no political 
wrangling, and different economic opportunities for fishers, the “overfishing 
problem” in the Pacific Northwest (and elsewhere) would not need to be the 
subject of countless books, journal articles, campaigns, and laws. By blaming the 
fishers exclusively for the loss of the resource they were so dependent on, people 
are able to tell a neat, packaged, tragic story while letting all other implicated 
parties, which include most residents of the Northwest according to Taylor, off 
the hook. 
Contemporary understandings of nature and science, a misguided faith in 
the ability of technology to solve complicated social problems, an unwillingness 
and/or inability to implement politically difficult regulatory measures, and 
unwavering commitment to an economic philosophy incompatible with 
preserving fish or the livelihoods of fishers have all combined to create the 
complex situation most of us boil down to “overfishing.”  The simple explanation 
of “too many fishermen, not enough fish” does not properly account for the 
effects of social conflict, political maneuvering, and the steady march of 
economic development at all costs in the collapse of fisheries. Until these 
processes are faced and properly understood by environmental managers, 
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policymakers, and the general public, there is little hope that we will be able to 
effectively manage our fisheries, or many other natural resources.  
Despite problematizing the term overfishing in this chapter, I will use it at 
times in this thesis to refer to the complex process that I will dissect in the 
following sections. When I use this term in this thesis, I use it to refer to the 
complex phenomenon with ecological, political, and economic, as well as 
physical and technological components. When used not as an explanation, but to 
describe a process, this problematic term becomes useful.  
 
Political and economic elements of overfishing 
One of the most important, and often overlooked components of the 
process of overfishing is the role of politics and economics in depleting fish 
populations. Given that by the early 1900s state and national government agencies 
in the US and Canada both began to recognize that fish stocks were in fact not 
infinite as their predecessors had assumed, and therefore that there would need to 
be regulations if they hoped to preserve this valuable resource for the future, how 
is it that the twentieth century saw some of the our most prolific fisheries collapse 
to a level from which they may never recover? McEvoy explains this in the 
context of the philosophies about nature, science, technology, and economics of 
the era. In California, as well as the rest of America, in the early twentieth century 
the ideology of the frontier was still a very important force in the way citizens and 
policymakers alike thought about nature and resources, especially the ocean. The 
idea of man conquering and taming wild and abundant nature still resonated, and 
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there was a feeling that there were always more fish to be caught, and always new 
places to fish. There was little room in this way of thinking for conservation or 
regulation of access to resources. At the same time, scientists understood little 
about the biology of fish beyond what was immediately commercially relevant, 
and nature as a whole was not understood or valued except as it was useful to 
human economies. Therefore, much of the failure to manage fisheries can be 
attributed to the fact that policy makers of the day managed to separate fish from 
both the economic forces that drove their harvest and the ecological ones which 
made their numbers fluctuate naturally (McEvoy 1986).  This left them few 
options, which, given the political climate that heavily favored growth at any cost, 
were ineffective at best.  
McEvoy offers an example of political divisions playing an important role 
in the overfishing of California’s fisheries, which, like so many others, were 
difficult to regulate in their early days because of the fractured, ethnically diverse, 
and divided nature of the fishery, and because of the frontier mindset that 
dominated California and its economic policy at the time. West Coast fisheries 
have long been an important industry of immigrants, which means that social, 
racial, and ethnic tensions lay just beneath the surface of many disputes over 
access and management. In California, the large and diverse immigrant 
populations sought to carve out familiar and profitable niches for themselves in 
the state’s rapidly growing, resource driven economy. Italians, Chinese, and many 
other, mainly poor, communities turned to the state’s rich fishing grounds for their 
livelihoods; at first a set of informal regulations allowed specific ethnic groups 
 
 
15 
exclusive claims on certain fish species and “everything [was] governed by laws 
which fishermen [had] made for themselves” (McEvoy 1986:96). In being able to 
regulate and protect their own fishery and piece of the market, fishers could 
stabilize their communities socially and economically by keeping competition and 
harvesting down, and fish prices up. However, as more and more people entered 
the fishery, and the stocks came under more intense pressure from more efficient 
commercial operations, conflict over the fishery generally erupted along 
ethnic/racial and class boundaries. There was no politically simple solution to 
solve the problem of increased pressure on the fishery; instead of making difficult 
decisions, it was easier to blame a villain, and in this case immigrants were an 
obvious, politically weak, popular scapegoat (McEvoy 1986). In New England 
and Canada, as chapter three will show, ethnic divisions were less of an issue, but 
conflict commonly erupted along class lines. As the fisheries came under more 
and more pressure, hostilities between groups of fishers intensified, with each 
accusing the other of overfishing. The line of fracture was different, but the theme 
was the same; as fish stocks declined, it was always someone else who was doing 
the overfishing.   
 
Physical and technological elements of overfishing 
As important as political and economic factors have been in creating 
situations of overfishing, technological advances as well as management decisions 
have played a very important role in the physical devastation of fish populations. 
Taylor examines the “durable crisis” of the slow decline of salmon fisheries in the 
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Pacific Northwest in this context. Taylor explains that “fishery management 
developed from a tangled alliance of politics, science, and technology during a 
specific period of history” and managers sought a “technological solution to a 
series of vexing social and political problems” (Taylor 1999:68). He examines 
carefully the contemporary view in the early twentieth century that science and 
technology would balance the damage economic development inflicted on the 
environment, and perhaps improve upon the way nature worked in the process.  
The social and political conflicts in fisheries become even more 
complicated when fishing fleets begin to mechanize; this is a pattern that has 
repeated itself all over the world. The same process that occurred on the west 
coast of the US that McEvoy describes in such detail also occurred in the east 
coast cod fishery and is currently underway off the west coast of Africa. 
California had rich resources, including fisheries, but the state’s residents were 
unable to fully exploit them until they also had cheap, abundant energy, and this 
was, and is, true for fisheries worldwide as well. Large inputs of fossil fuels 
dramatically change fisheries, bringing tremendous wealth and capacity to the 
fishery, and eventually decimating once abundant fish stocks. Mechanization 
allows bigger boats to fish farther out, and catch more fish faster with less 
manpower. Increasingly, poorer fishing communities find themselves pushed to 
the margins of the industry, while well-funded boats, often capitalized by large 
companies, gain importance and power. In most cases governments become even 
more unable and unwilling to regulate the ever-growing mechanized, industrial 
fleets. In California, New England, Canada, and countless other cases, the 
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dramatic technological change ends up hurting more than it helps; by allowing 
fishers to exploit new fish stocks as the old ones disappear, mechanized fishing 
disguises declining catches, at least for a while. Further, mechanization 
transforms the social aspects of fishing, changing who fishes where and for what, 
and alters the balance of power considerably towards those who can afford to 
upgrade their gear.  Mechanized fishing not only allows fishers to more fully 
exploit their fisheries, it also ties the fishing industry more closely to the larger, 
interdependent, fossil fuel reliant economy, which makes the fishery more 
vulnerable to seemingly unrelated economic and political events, even as 
mechanization greatly increases the pressure on fish stocks from the industry 
itself (McEvoy 1986).  
Taylor offers another cautionary tale regarding technology when 
discussing the role of hatcheries in fisheries decision-making in the Pacific 
Northwest, this time about relying on technical solutions to solve complex social 
problems. Hatcheries have not been particularly important in New England and 
Eastern Canada or in West Africa (yet), but his warning applies to a reliance on 
management and fisheries science in the case of the US and Canada, and may 
apply to Africa too, as more and more people are suggesting fish farming as a 
solution to that region’s fisheries problems.  Taylor explains that after so many 
years of promoting hatcheries, managers were reluctant to admit their strategy 
didn’t work, and to this day continue to layer “technology on technology” to such 
an extent that “they [have] lost sight of the underlying social roots of the 
problem” (Taylor 1999: 230). A misguided faith in the ability of hatcheries and 
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other technology to solve the problem of declining runs combined with political 
and social conflicts that defined other aspects of management to create what 
Taylor calls the “excruciatingly long disaster” of the decline of the Northwest’s 
once abundant salmon. 
 
Analyzing overfishing 
The complicated and uneven history of fisheries management in the US 
has had profound social and environmental consequences. The processes and 
themes discussed above continue to be played out in fisheries all over the US and 
indeed the world. The economics of fisheries, especially as they decline, often 
leads to stark divisions within the fisheries themselves, and, the divided sides 
search to find someone to blame rather than examining the more complex reasons 
behind the decline. The search for someone to blame becomes mired in struggles 
for social legitimacy and political considerations, losing sight of the ecological 
damage at hand. In too many cases science and technology, based in skewed or 
misunderstood views of nature and fish, are expected to save fisheries. But, 
behind all this, is the basic view of economic development as good and inevitable, 
and a willingness to sacrifice fish and fishers alike in the name of such 
“progress.” This complicated set of processes played out not only in McEvoy’s 
California fisheries and in Taylor’s salmon runs; it is still being played out in 
various forms in declining fisheries worldwide.  
As early as 1915 W.F. Thompson proved that “the simple addition of more 
gear to a fishery could sustain increasing harvests long after the resource had 
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begun to decline” (McEvoy 1986:158). Thompson emphasized that scientists and 
managers could not study depletion of fish populations and their environment 
without also looking at the economic forces driving the harvest. Clearly then, 
policymakers knew the dangers faced by California’s and other fisheries long 
before they declined and collapsed, but there was little anyone was willing to do 
to stop it. A frontier mentality combined with undying faith in economic progress 
hobbled any meaningful effort to save the fisheries until it was too late. In the 
1960s, during negotiations over the future management of California’s then much 
depleted fisheries, Wilbert McLeod Chapman, an industry “cheerleader”, 
observed that if one wishes to effectively regulate a fishery it is necessary for the 
industry to have gone broke first, in order for participants to be willing to 
cooperate with serious management changes and conservation measures (McEvoy 
1986). McEvoy shows in his analysis how, for reasons of social divisions at first, 
and as time progressed considerations of economics and politics, efforts to 
manage California’s once abundant fisheries were ineffective at best and an 
outright failure at worst. As he explains in his conclusion,  
“Economic distress was the goad to public action 
and economic gain the gauge of its effect. The 
resources themselves were passive objects of 
technological and political manipulation, while the 
harvesters’ freedom to use the fisheries as they saw 
fit was an article of faith. The real causes of 
depletion- social costs transmitted to the fisheries 
ecologically and the social forces that sustained the 
Hobbesian struggle of all against all in which the 
fishers were trapped- went entirely unaccounted.” 
(McEvoy 1986: 251) 
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Though both McEvoy and Chapman were speaking about California’s fisheries, 
they may as well have been talking about the east coast cod fishery, or any other 
fishery that has collapsed under tremendous pressure, since the process in 
California is eerily similar to what occurred in New England and Eastern Canada.  
McEvoy emphasizes again and again that the story of fisheries depletion 
not only shows us the environment, economics, and politics colliding at the 
expense of fishers and fish, but also offers a broader lesson about the ways 
Americans approach environmental and resource-based problems, and how that 
approach dooms us to repeat the cycle he describes over and over. 
 As fragmented as the commercial fishing industry was in the early 
twentieth century Pacific Northwest, all commercial fishers faced a huge political 
threat from the growing influence of sport fishermen, or anglers. Sportsmen 
wished to preserve salmon runs for their own recreation, and as the region became 
more urbanized, the number of residents whose views of nature and fish matched 
those of anglers grew dramatically. Anglers too claimed to be pushing for 
conservation, but Taylor points out that the very economic pursuits and 
development that had brought so many recreational anglers to the region were 
probably doing more harm to salmon populations than the much vilified, though 
politically weak, commercial fishers. Despite the rhetoric of the angler’s political 
lobbying, they did little for conservation, simply replacing commercial catches 
with recreational ones, and completely ignoring the other factors affecting salmon 
populations. In the end, most commercial fishers who were displaced by the 
efforts of the politically powerful anglers simply turned to the sea for their 
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livelihoods, fishing from ecologically abysmal ocean trawlers, and thus further 
contributing to the decline of salmon runs anyway. As Taylor concludes, “anglers 
did not intend to harm salmon, but their political agenda and economies 
nevertheless played a central, if unexamined role in the escalating destruction of 
runs” (Taylor 1999:202). Taylor uses the example of the anglers to caution 
against being uncritical of our own impacts on declining fisheries while blaming 
fishermen. Though the situations are different, it is important to remember the 
role of non-fishers in the debate about overfishing in the case studies in chapters 
three and four of this thesis.  
These patterns that together comprise overfishing have repeated 
themselves in New England and Canada, with disastrous results for the people 
who relied on those fisheries. The most worrisome part is that those same patterns 
are now showing themselves in West Africa.  
 
Environmental justice in marine fisheries 
Though the gloomy prognosis for the world’s fisheries over the next few 
decades has serious implications for the US and other industrialized nations, the 
impact on developing countries in the Third World will be far worse. Too often 
people discuss the potential loss of marine fisheries as a purely environmental 
problem, not recognizing that “fisheries are as much about people as fish” (PEW 
2003). This is not a problem for the distant future either; the very real impacts of 
the decline of major fish species are already being felt in fishing communities all 
over the world. As with so many other environmental problems and resource 
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issues, the benefits and costs of the tremendous overfishing of the world’s oceans 
are extremely uneven, with the poor, in industrialized nations and especially in the 
Third World, suffering the most and receiving few if any of the short-term 
benefits. This uneven distribution of negative environmental impacts and the 
extremely unequal power relations involved in the exploitation of important 
fisheries make this issue one of political ecology and environmental justice. 
Environmental justice started as a social movement in the (Southern) 
United States in response to racially unequal environmental circumstances, where 
a marginalized group (usually a minority, almost always poor) suffers a 
disproportionately heavy burden of environmental risks and harms without 
experiencing the environmental benefits that other wealthier, non-minority 
citizens do. Laura Pulido emphasizes the importance of geography in 
environmental justice because it is all about relationships between places, which 
are inherently spatial (Pulido 2000). Environmental justice is often a fiercely local 
issue (ex. where an environmental hazard is located), but these conflicts do not 
only occur at the local scale; decisions about environmental costs and benefits are 
often made at the state and/or national level, and now are frequently influenced at 
the international level as well. 
Political ecology is very similar to environmental justice, except that it 
started out as an academic field not a social movement, and most often tends to 
study rural cases in the Third World, while environmental justice has traditionally 
been an urban and First World concern. Political ecology looks at how people and 
societies interact with the environment, and puts those interactions into a political 
 
 
23 
economy perspective. Human interactions with the environment are inherently 
political and economic, especially common conflicts studied by political 
ecologists like resource use, environmental policy, and environmental 
change/degradation. Political ecology emphasizes the importance of power 
relations and the social/political creation of vulnerability. Again, political ecology 
looks at relationships and interactions between places, which is inherently 
geographical.  
These overlapping and intertwined frameworks of environmental justice 
and political ecology are concerned with spatially, socially, economically, and 
politically marginalized groups suffering disproportionately from environmental 
degradation while receiving none of the benefits reaped by those who exploit the 
environment. Marginalization and exploitation in the international economy and 
the unequal distribution of environmental costs and benefits is fundamentally 
what is at issue in global fisheries depletion, therefore, though neither the fisheries 
of the Northwest Atlantic or West Africa are traditional settings of environmental 
justice, they are in fact distinct cases of environmental injustice, and need to be 
examined within this framework.  
At the heart of any discussion about justice in fisheries, is the issue of 
environmental governance, and the conflicts that governance generates. 
Environmental governance can be thought of as the “institutional arrangements 
through which decisions about natural resources are taken, and the management 
practices by which those decisions are enacted” (Perreault 2006:151). In the case 
of fisheries, governance usually occurs across several levels.  At the local level 
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both formal government regulations and informal arrangements among fishers 
allocate the use of the resource. Federal laws, as well as economic policies and 
subsidies act at the national level. There are also international structures of 
governance, all of which combine to govern the use of the resource. These levels 
of governance will be discussed further in chapters three and four. The institutions 
that govern fisheries have created gross inequalities in access to and use of the 
resource, generating conflict between those who gain from exploiting fish stocks, 
and those whose livelihoods are most negatively impacted when those stocks are 
depleted. The unequal power relations that generate such governance structures, 
as well as the extremely uneven distribution of environmental benefits and 
consequences of exploiting fisheries resources, make the overfishing of marine 
fisheries worldwide an issue of environmental justice. This thesis focuses on 
issues of environmental justice in a First World setting, the Northwest Atlantic 
cod fishery, and a similar, but Third World, case in West Africa. 
At the local level, the collapse of crucial fish species has been a concern 
for several decades in some communities (as I will show in the next chapter), but 
what makes the current situation particularly alarming, is that overfishing has 
gone global. The collapse of important fisheries in the global North, especially in 
the US, the EU, Canada, and Japan, has fueled ever more intense, industrial 
fishing in an effort to keep up with growing demand. Seafood is as popular as 
ever in industrialized nations, and high prices have lured those fleets to the waters 
of Third World countries in search of valuable fish. The fisheries of many of these 
developing nations are already strained by their own growing populations, and the 
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addition of industrialized foreign fleets is a serious threat. For nearly one billion 
residents of developing countries, the implications of the loss of their fisheries are 
more drastic than higher seafood prices; for those whose main source of protein is 
fish, this is a matter of survival (Halweil 2006). 
  
Unequal Power Relations 
 Having extensively overfished their own waters, the fishing fleets of the 
First World have descended on the global South in search of fish (and profits). As 
Becky Mansfield (2001a) points out, these fleets were purposely developed and 
supported by their own governments, and in many cases the decimation of 
domestic fish stocks was government sponsored. Now, all that excess capacity 
(much of it heavily subsidized) is turning to the waters of developing countries for 
fish. In theory, Third World nations have a powerful international law on their 
side, allowing them to keep foreign fishermen out of their waters. Established to 
protect these vital fisheries in the developing world, Exclusive Economic Zones 
give countries territorial rights over the 200 nautical miles of ocean off of their 
coasts (Mansfield 2001b). As Mansfield discusses extensively in her work, 
countries like the United States and Japan have used this increased power and 
territory to their advantage, building up their fleets to better exploit their new 
resource and developing complicated agreements with those who wish to fish off 
their coasts (Mansfield 2001a). Ironically, the developing countries this new 
system was designed to protect have been the ones least able to make it work to 
their benefit. While the US, the EU, Japan, and others have the money and power 
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to build and often subsidize their fleets and manage and regulate their fisheries 
(PEW 2003), most Third World governments are either too poor, too corrupt, or 
too weak (or some combination of these) to regulate, let alone truly build and 
manage their fishing industries. Mansfield points out that EEZs have been a 
tremendous benefit to those states that have managed to effectively exploit them, 
but in order to do that they first had to establish and maintain control over their 
new ocean territory. Simply having an EEZ does not guarantee that a nation can 
control it, and those countries unable to manage their coasts have also been unable 
to benefit from them the way much of the First World has (Mansfield 2001b).  
 The effective exploitation of First World oceans has indirectly dealt 
another blow to those countries unable to exert effective control over their EEZs 
because they found themselves in a weak bargaining position when 
representatives of First World governments came looking to negotiate fishing 
rights in Third World EEZs. First World governments now offer money and 
sometimes aid to developing countries in exchange for access to their fishing 
grounds. On the surface, this type of agreement seems like it would allow 
developing nations to benefit from a natural resource. However, usually the 
money involved is a sizable amount to a poor country, but a tiny fraction of the 
money sunk into industrialized fishing fleets, and the developing nations are in no 
position to refuse this kind of “bargain” with more powerful countries (Clover 
2006). Fishing is no longer a small-time enterprise since industrialized fishing 
methods are prohibitively expensive, so these unequal power dynamics allow for 
First World governments to negotiate for multinational corporations to exploit yet 
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another resource rightly belonging to a Third World country. And, as in many 
other situations of resource exploitation, there are also unequal power dynamics 
within the developing countries, further marginalizing those who depend on 
fisheries for their livelihoods and survival. The people who rely most on fishing 
for food and employment are usually economically marginal within their own 
countries, and have little or no political power as a result. Often when fishing 
rights are negotiated with powerful First World countries, the agreements are 
made with local political elites, not those who will be directly affected, which 
means that the people with the most immediate stake in how domestic fisheries 
are managed have no voice in the decision making process. Clearly, unequal 
power relations at the global, national, and local levels leave developing nations, 
especially the poor within those nations who are most likely to be dependent on 
fish for survival, at a huge disadvantage when dealing with international fishing 
fleets from powerful industrialized countries.  
 
Impact on Developing Nations 
 Just as the power distribution and relationships that determine how 
fisheries are governed are extremely uneven, the impacts of overfishing and 
depleting those fisheries are also uneven. As Becky Mansfield emphasizes in 
multiple articles, there are many different forms and manifestations of 
neoliberalization and exploitation of the oceans, but “all forms entail reducing the 
options of those who once relied on public fisheries, while giving to those who 
qualify a form of wealth that can then be used for further gain” (Mansfield 
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2004:323). As those with wealth gain access to and/or control over fisheries, the 
people who suffer the most are those fishers with little wealth or power. This is 
true in both First and Third World situations, but is most pronounced and 
widespread in the cases where industrialized (and in the case of the Third World, 
foreign) fishing fleets gain, through the exploitation of unequal power dynamics, 
access to economically and socially vital fisheries. Poor, local fishermen cannot 
afford to compete with industrialized fleets for fish, since these fleets employ 
expensive technologies and extremely efficient methods (though these techniques 
are actually inefficient in the long run). First World, industrialized fishing boats 
use GPS and sonar (“fish finders”) to locate and track schools of fish in places 
that were previously inaccessible (Whitty 2006). Industrial fishing techniques like 
trawling, and the use of longlines and driftnets, catch more fish in a few hours 
than small scale, low-tech local operations could hope to catch in days. Not only 
does the use of industrial fishing methods mean there are fewer fish in the sea for 
local fishermen to catch, these methods also catch and kill many juveniles of 
important species and smaller fish lower on the food chain as “bycatch”, making 
these practices at once efficient and impressively wasteful (Whitty 2006).  
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Industrial trawl net and destruction of sea floor (from National Geographic) 
 
Bycatch, thrown overboard as trash (from National Geographic) 
 
Both by killing other sea life and by destroying ocean habitat, these industrial 
practices damage the entire ecosystem, depleting fish populations and reducing 
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chances of recovery and future productivity (Whitty 2006). Faced with this kind 
of competition, local fishermen turn to more desperate methods that are also 
ecologically harmful. As the populations of larger fish dwindle, fishermen, both 
foreign/industrial and local, turn to populations of fish farther down the food 
chain. Fish that would not have been considered edible a decade ago are now not 
only being eaten by those in the Third World with few alternatives, but also are 
being caught and sold in industrialized nations, as once popular fish are becoming 
too rare to meet ever growing demand. This is a dangerous turn of events because 
by turning to the fish that are farther down the food chain, we damage the 
ecosystems of struggling fish species, further jeopardizing their chances of 
recovery. Marine scientist Daniel Pauly also finds this trend alarming because it 
indicates that we are rapidly running out of fish species to turn to and are having a 
more dramatic impact on the ocean than most people realize (Pauly 2000).   
 Unfortunately, the negative impacts of overfishing in the waters of 
developing nations do not end there. Not only does competition drive local 
fishermen into unemployment, it often deprives them and their families of an 
important source of nutrition and a substantial part of their diet. Fish that local 
populations used to rely on for their main source of protein are now sold instead 
on the international market; and even if they still reach local markets, these fish 
are too expensive for those who cannot afford any alternatives and depend on 
seafood for their survival. The loss of fish as a staple food contributes to 
malnutrition and health problems among the poor, often disproportionately 
impacting women and children (Halweil 2006). Foreign exploitation of fisheries 
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in developing countries also undermines any efforts within local fishing 
communities at cooperation and/or fisheries management. In this way, the 
exploitation of Third World fisheries is very much like the exploitation of other 
resources in this era of globalization (especially essential ones like fresh water). 
Demand on the global market influences local economics and power 
relationships, and poor, marginalized populations are the ones who feel the 
consequences most acutely.  
 
West Africa and the EU 
 The dynamics and situations I have described above play out, with 
obvious local variations, all over the world, especially in Africa, Latin America, 
the South Pacific, and Southeast Asia. There are hundreds of cases that fit within 
the basic political ecology framework, most in the Third World and/or between 
First World and Third World countries, though there are a few within the First 
World. The case of the European fleets in West Africa, discussed in detail in 
chapter four, is typical in many ways, though because of the history between these 
regions, it has some distinct undercurrents as well.  
 Europeans love seafood and in many places it is an important part of local 
cuisine. However, very little fish eaten in Europe is actually caught in European 
waters, because most fish stocks there have been drastically depleted for years. 
The EU increasingly turns to the global South, specifically Africa, for fish to feed 
its wealthy, seafood-loving population. Africa has been an ideal region for 
exploitation both because it is relatively close to Europe, and because large parts 
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of the continent are poor and/or unstable, making these areas easier to exploit. 
Despite the stated socially and environmentally responsible goals of the European 
Union, the actions of European fishing fleets in West Africa have been just the 
opposite. EU fleets have turned to one-sided agreements with West African 
nations, paying a relatively small amount (often in the tens of millions) in 
exchange for the right to bring in economically and ecologically damaging 
industrial fishing fleets.  
Many find the entire situation even more reprehensible because the EU’s 
highly regarded policy guidelines, which state that EU interactions with the 
developing world should “reduce poverty and promote sustainable development” 
(Kaczynski and Fluharty 2002) looks like pure hypocrisy in the face of what 
European fleets are doing in Africa. It should also be pointed out that the 
exploitation of an African resource by Europeans at the expense of local 
populations has a very “imperial echo” (Clover 2006: 45). Most of West Africa 
was at one time under European colonial rule, and exploited for resources and 
labor. Even though African nations have technically entered into agreements as 
sovereign nations, not as colonies, the unequal power relations, and history of 
exploitation of resources at the expense of the poor in Africa, give these 
accusations weight. 
 The history of exploitation and imperial undertones of this situation in 
West Africa tie it to another case of political ecology and environmental justice, 
thousands of miles away. In his account of the history of resource extraction in 
the upper Amazon, Soren Hvalkof emphasizes that a history of exploitation of the 
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land, resources and people continues into the present (Hvalkof 2000). In the upper 
Amazon, the resources and actors have changed over time, but the patterns have 
not. This holds true for West Africa as well; today it is fisheries being exploited 
and depleted at the expense of locals, in the past it has been other important 
natural resources, from agricultural products to raw materials, metals, diamonds, 
and of course, slaves. While the specifics of the case in the upper Amazon are 
quite different than those in this case in West Africa, the underlying patterns, 
histories, power dynamics, and uneven outcomes/impacts are all too similar. 
Mansfield also emphasizes the importance of the history of resource use in a 
particular place in determining how that resource is used and/or exploited today 
(Mansfield 2001a). This is especially important when it comes to something like 
fish, which is at once viewed as a highly necessary “common good”, vital to the 
lives and livelihoods of locals, and as an internationally demanded commodity. 
As is commonly revealed by an environmental justice and political ecology 
analysis, the current situation in West Africa’s fisheries is one where non-local (in 
this case global) processes have a huge impact at the local level (Mansfield 
2001a). Though they may not realize it, seafood buyers in the First World are now 
often competing with those in the Third World for the increasingly scarce 
resource of fish. As is too often the case, the poor, marginalized populations lose 
out, unable to compete or defend their livelihoods against global processes and 
demands.  
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Conclusion 
 In her analysis of what she calls “the new geography of the oceans”, 
Becky Mansfield explains that the combination of the creation of Exclusive 
Economic Zones, and the increasingly global nature of the fishing industry, “has 
created new possibilities for resource exploitation as well as resource 
management” (Mansfield 2001a: 393). What she means is that the system of 
EEZs that was intended to protect Third World countries from resource 
exploitation by industrialized nations and allow them to manage their own 
resources has not only failed to protect those countries, in some cases it has 
enabled the creation of exploitive agreements. Unequal power dynamics have and 
will continue to ensure unequal outcomes unless environmental justice and 
political ecology considerations are taken into account. Going forward, as the 
situation of the world’s fisheries becomes more and more dire, it will be essential 
that we consider not only the environmental costs and benefits of policies and 
actions, but the social impacts as well.  
When viewed as an issue of political ecology and/or environmental 
justice, the situation of marine fisheries, especially in the Third World, is certainly 
one of fish, the environment, and biodiversity, but most importantly it is a case 
about people. Attempts to “save the ocean” need to be explicitly tied to efforts to 
save the communities and people that depend on the ocean for their survival. 
Fisheries and ocean management are about fish and the environment, but the link 
between the health of fisheries and the health of large percentages of the world’s 
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population, physically, socially, and economically, cannot and should not be 
ignored.  
The processes that have occurred in Northeastern North America and that 
are occurring in West Africa are quite similar in many ways, and I argue that each 
is an issue of environmental justice broadly conceived. However, as the next two 
chapters will show, New Englanders and Canadians who were reliant on the 
fishery have certainly suffered, but they weren’t and aren’t in danger of 
starvation. Even in today’s neoliberal political environment, the governments, 
especially Canada’s, have tried to help struggling fishing communities. There is 
no such support structure in place if and when West Africa’s fishery fails.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
36 
 
THREE 
NORTHWEST ATLANTIC COD FISHERY 
 
The depletion and collapse of the Northwest Atlantic cod fishery is 
extremely, perhaps excessively, well documented from a variety of disciplinary 
perspectives, with particular attention to the New England states in the US and 
Newfoundland in Canada. In this chapter I will discuss the specifics of this fishery 
and its importance to the region, then discuss the processes that lead to its 
dramatic (and seemingly sudden) collapse in the early 1990s. In discussing the 
run-up to the collapse I will focus on power dynamics in decision-making, and on 
the differences within the fishery in terms of who has benefited and who has 
suffered from what policies and impacts. I will also discuss what has happened 
since the collapse, focusing most on the fishermen who were left without a 
livelihood or who are watching it disappear.  
The prolific cod fishery along the coasts of the New England States of the 
US and the Maritime Provinces and Newfoundland-Labrador of Canada, has been 
an important resource for this region since the earliest European settlers came to 
North America. Cities and towns from Massachusetts to Maine to Newfoundland 
were built with the help of cod; whose seemingly endless numbers directly and 
indirectly supported economies for hundreds of years. However, in the early 
1990s, with little warning, the great cod stocks collapsed dramatically, forcing the 
Canadian government to close its most important fishery (which has yet to 
reopen) and eliciting a similar response from American officials. Though some 
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fishermen had warned that cod populations were under stress, the collapse was 
largely a surprise to fisheries scientists, the fishing industry, and the general 
public alike, and those coastal communities heavily dependent on the fishery for 
their livelihoods were left reeling. Over fifteen years later, many of these 
communities still bear the scars of economic displacement from the collapse. 
Clearly then, the collapse of the Northwest Atlantic cod population was more than 
an ecological disaster, it was a serious social and economic disaster as well. This 
chapter examines the processes and dynamics that lead to the dramatic collapse of 
the cod fishery as well as what its impact has been on the people who were 
dependent on that resource. This will set up a comparison to chapter four, the case 
study on West Africa.  
 
Fishery as a resource 
Ecology 
 The cold waters of the Northwest Atlantic are rich in nutrients and home 
to a great variety of marine life, including cod. For this region, Atlantic Cod were 
the most important, most abundant, and most intensively fished species for 
centuries. They thrive in cold water, are omnivorous and easy to catch, and are 
prized for their white, protein-rich meat (Kurlansky 1997).  
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Atlantic Cod 
 
Cod, and other economically important species, as well as whales and 
other marine life, tend to concentrate on the “banks”, shallow regions of the 
continental shelf. the warm Gulf Stream meets the cold Labrador Current off the 
coast of New England and Canada, creating an ideal environment for sea life from 
the plankton and tiny fish at the bottom of the marine food chain, all the way to 
large predatory fish and marine mammals. The most important of these banks for 
New England are George’s Bank and Stellwagen Bank. For Canada, it is the 
Grand Banks. Their abundant sea life and proximity to shore have meant that the 
banks have been the site of intense fishing efforts as well as conflicts, and a 
source of wealth for New England and Eastern Canada, for hundreds of years. 
New Englanders were known to refer to “the sacred cod” and the fish can be 
found as a decorative symbol of wealth in many of the region’s old buildings. 
Though their populations fluctuate naturally with changes in water temperature 
and food supply, cod are highly adaptable and resilient fish; as late as the turn of 
the last century, Canadian officials honestly believed it was impossible for cod to 
be anything but abundant far into the future. Kurlansky (1997) remarks that 
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despite this, the cod were undone by a predator even more greedy and omnivorous 
than they are: humans.    
 
Cod (from the Provincial Archives of Newfoundland and Labrador) 
 
For example, George’s Bank, the source of the Massachusetts fishery’s 
wealth, has historically been home to large numbers of cod, haddock, and 
flounder. A combination of extremely intensive fishing efforts by a large 
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industrial fishing fleet and damage to the habitat of these bottom-dwelling species 
by bottom trawlers stressed these populations to the point of collapse. According 
to a recent PEW Oceans Commission report on American fisheries, in 1980 cod 
catches peaked at 115 million pounds, and by 1994 cod catches had dropped to 
only 30 million pounds despite increased fishing effort and improvements in 
technology (PEW 2003: 12). The report goes on to estimate that more than 20,000 
New Englanders lost their jobs when the cod stocks collapsed, with devastating 
impacts on coastal communities (PEW 2003: 12). Those small fishing operations 
that managed to stay in business turned to other species, including scallops that 
thrived in the absence of their natural predator, the cod, and awaited the return of 
cod stocks, which some experts fear will never come. The report offers the 
startling fact that “by 1999, what were once the most valuable fisheries in this 
fishing rich region of the nation accounted for only four percent of the region’s 
total catch by value, and three percent by weight” (PEW 2003:12). 
The Canadian government had been concerned about its fisheries for 
years, but largely ignored the warning signs that a collapse was imminent. In July 
of 1992, they declared a moratorium on all cod catches, but stocks have shown 
few signs of rebounding even fifteen years later. In places like Newfoundland, 
where the majority of the population was, in some fashion, linked to the fishery, 
and fishing formed the basis of the economy, the results of the collapse were not 
only locally, but regionally devastating.  
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Canadian Cod Catch 
 
Local importance 
Northeastern North America’s fishing grounds have sustained fishing 
communities for hundreds of years. The past century has seen a distinct division 
appear within the fishery between the large, industrialized off-shore fishing fleet, 
and the smaller on-shore fleet based in coastal communities. The off-shore fleet is 
usually capital-intensive, owned and run by corporations, and uses industrial, 
destructive fishing methods to catch massive quantities of fish. This fleet, due to 
its size and technological advantage can fish far out to sea. The on-shore fishery, 
on the other hand, is made up of “smaller, community based fishing operations 
[that] are typically looked upon as the mainstays of coastal communities, 
 
 
42 
providing diverse jobs in local economies” (PEW 2003: 3). The differences and 
dynamics between these two fisheries are often compared to the situation in the 
farming industry with industrialized agribusiness and family farms. In fact, many 
economists and fisheries scientists have expressed a desire to transform the 
fishing industry in a fashion similar to the way agriculture was completely 
transformed in the twentieth century. However, despite decades of calls for 
consolidation and privatization, Northwest Atlantic fishing communities have 
resisted this trend, with some limited success.  My focus will be on the on-shore 
fishery as this was the sector hardest hit by the cod collapse, and is where this 
situation becomes an issue of environmental justice, though not in a traditional 
environmental justice setting.  
 Kevin St. Martin describes in detail how on-shore fisheries typically 
function including dynamics between fishermen and their ties to the larger 
community. The systems he discusses are the very ones fishing communities are 
struggling to protect in the face of declining fish stocks and economic and 
government pressures. Most on-shore fishing operations are family run, often 
going back many generations. Coastal fishing communities are described as 
“networks of fishermen and the people who support them” (St. Martin 2006: 537); 
all elements of this network contribute to, and are affected by, the success or 
failure of fishing. This fishery is not capital-intensive, so the investments tend to 
be small. Most investment in the on-shore fishery comes from within the coastal 
community itself, and most capital generated is either re-invested in the fishery 
(even in times of scarcity, when it is not considered economically rational to do 
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so), or within the local community (St. Martin 2006). St. Martin explains the 
tight-knit nature of the fishing communities, and the centrality of the fishery 
within them, saying, “communities are linked directly to the common resources 
insofar as each crewmember’s livelihood as well as that of the boat owner is a 
function of the health of the resource” (St. Martin 2006: 537). The community 
nature of the on-shore fishery is further exemplified by the share system, 
“characterized by the rules that govern the distribution of fish catches amongst 
boat and crewmembers…in general, when catches are large, boat owners and all 
crewmembers involved benefit according to an agreed upon set of proportions, 
and, when catches are small, all suffer the same relative loss” (St. Martin 2006: 
534). Generally, crewmembers are considered to be co-venturers, even partial 
owners, in the catch, not employees, making the dynamic between boat owner and 
crew quite different from, for example, the labor relations in modern agriculture, 
or most other industries. In fact, most boat owners identify themselves as 
fishermen, just like their crews, and most crewmembers plan to own their own 
boats one day; this system appears to be rooted in a deeply ingrained belief in 
fairness and independence that runs through fishing communities (St. Martin 
2006).  
 As has happened in so many resource dependent communities in recent 
years, there has been pressure on fishing operations to restructure towards a more 
capitalist, privatized system. Some of this has been in response to the problems of 
the fishery, as many economists see the “un-capitalist” nature of fisheries as the 
reason for their failure (overlooking, of course, that most of the damage is done 
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by the distinctly capitalist, large scale operations), but some of this pressure is 
simply part of the larger neo-liberal trend towards privatization of resources to 
increase profit. As Perreault explains, in this movement towards privatization, 
“resources…are no longer conceived of as public goods that individuals have 
rights to as citizens, but rather as scarce commodities whose access for consumers 
is mediated by the market” (Perreault 2006: 153). This is certainly true in the case 
of the Northwest Atlantic’s fisheries; cod had long been considered a public good 
that was owned by no one. Access to the fishery was by no means open, as most 
fishing communities had unofficial claims to specific fishing grounds, but 
“fisheries in general defy any straightforward assignment of property 
rights…because many economically important fish species are highly mobile” 
(Sneddon 2007: 174). This neoliberal push towards privatization and other 
restructuring threatens the local governance of the fisheries and the share system, 
and thus the entire structure of small scale fishing communities. In their efforts to 
resist these changes, fishermen emphasize, “the entirety of what might be 
undermined: community, local economies, small businesses, and their 
‘livelihoods’….such rhetoric often has the effect of relegating the concerns of 
fishermen and fishing communities…to a romantic or archaic vision of fishing 
communities” (St. Martin 2006: 538) and thus does little to help their cause. 
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North Atlantic Fisheries Organization (NAFO) map of the Northwest 
Atlantic, showing continental shelf, important banks, and EEZs.   
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Governance dynamics 
The abundant cod fisheries of this region were also considered an 
important international commodity, which meant that members of the on-shore 
fleet were not the only ones concerned with, or involved in, its governance. In a 
recent article, Schroeder et al. comment on the presence of the types of dynamics 
one might expect to find in the Third World existing in First World settings, 
saying that “the same forces that produced the Third World as such are 
responsible for creating peripheries…within advanced capitalist nations as well” 
(Schroeder et al. 2006). As St. Martin co-authored the article, Schroeder et al. use 
the Northwest Atlantic fisheries as a prime example of this; a corporate off-shore 
fishing industry runs up against a small scale, community based fishery in a 
dynamic that is usually associated with the Third World.  
Davis et al. emphasize again and again that the on-shore and off-shore 
fisheries represent “two distinctive vested interests” and point out that the 
conflicts between their interests are “exacerbated by the role and activity of the 
federal and provincial governments” (Davis et al. 1984: 110). Even though the 
Canadian Atlantic fishery seems to have been in a state of perpetual crisis for 
years, the most recent problems are rooted in the creation of Canada’s EEZ and 
the “overly optimistic expansion” of the fishing industry in the following years 
(Davis et al. 1984: 108). Years of policies that have been detrimental to on-shore 
fishing operations and the communities that depend on them have made 
fishermen, and often whole communities, dependent on government welfare 
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programs and services, creating a sense of bitterness, hostility, and powerlessness 
in many coastal communities (Davis et al. 1984). Conflicting government 
jurisdictions and motivations has added to conflict and on-shore fishermen’s 
frustrations with government policy. The federal government has jurisdiction over 
Canada’s EEZ and marine resources, and is forced to balance the corporate 
interests of the off-shore fleet with the “populist pressures” from coastal 
communities built around the on-shore fleet. The provincial governments have 
some jurisdiction over their immediate coastal areas, and therefore the realm of 
most on-shore fishermen, but are more attuned to the interests of the large 
corporate processors and the off-shore fleet (Davis et al. 1984). Both federal and 
provincial governments tend to view the off-shore, corporate sector of the 
industry as “economic” and the on-shore, community based sector as “social.” 
This division not only implies that the on-shore fishery is not economically 
important, it forms the basis of government policies that have bolstered and built 
up the off-shore fishing fleet, while essentially placing the on-shore fleet on 
welfare, keeping the sector “alive but not viable” (Davis et al. 1984: 119). They 
also point out that the division into two extremely different sectors puts the on-
shore fishermen at a further disadvantage as far as having their voices heard, or 
being involved in the decision making process. It is clear that the government has 
tended to be “much more likely to be responsive to a unified sector with a clear-
cut definition of its interests, as opposed to a diverse, fragmented, and dependent 
sector” (Davis et al. 1984: 121). 
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The on-shore vs. off-shore dynamic is exemplified, albeit unintentionally, 
by the last of five major task forces on fisheries in the past hundred years 
organized by the Canadian government before the cod stocks collapsed: the Task 
Force on Atlantic Fisheries, which was issued in 1982. The biases in the report, 
specifically the favoritism shown to the off-shore fishing fleet at the expense of 
the on-shore sector, have been subject to sharp criticism for the continued 
government support of these policies, despite strong evidence that this is just the 
wrong sort of policy to pursue. Government policies that have harmed, but just 
barely sustained, the on-shore fishery, while supporting the growth of the off-
shore fleet, are directly responsible for the environmental disaster of the cod 
collapse, and its harsh social consequences in coastal fishing communities.  
Barrett et al. (1984) argue that, “the thrust of the report and subsequent policy 
implementation in Newfoundland is to encourage concentration and centralization 
of capital onshore and at sea. It is our contention that this policy is ill conceived 
as it bails out big capital yet again, supporting and making stronger what, in our 
view, is the chief cause of the industry’s problems in the first place” (Barrett et al. 
1984: 126). The Task Force follows in the footsteps of many government reports 
before it (and, for that matter, most other writings on the problems in fisheries) by 
claiming that the “common property” nature of fisheries resources is the root of 
all of the problems in the industry. The report does not discuss more recent 
information indicating that the community structures that regulate in-shore 
fisheries seem to be quite effective in managing fishing grounds. It is believed 
that, contrary to what the Task Force would have you believe, “for inshore/near 
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shore fishermen with deep historical-familial roots in their communities, making a 
living neither requires nor features the hostile and chaotic behavior predicted by 
the common property perspective. Socio-economic life is, in fact, much more co-
operative and community-managed within these fishing settlements than this 
perspective suggests” (Barrett et al. 1984: 128).  Instead, it seems that the 
“Hobbesian view” of all against all, more accurately describes the behavior of the 
off-shore fishing efforts.  
The industrialized, corporate-controlled fleet is where fierce competition 
drives the use of environmentally harmful fishing methods and drastic over-
harvesting in an effort to turn a large profit as quickly as possible, with little 
regard for the environment, other fishermen, or the future of the resource. Despite 
the claims of economists that large, vertically integrated, capital intensive, and 
often state-subsidized fishing operations must be more efficient than smaller 
operations, they are actually far less efficient in the short term due to the 
tremendous capital invested in them (not to mention the energy they need just to 
operate), and are environmentally disastrous in the longer term. Smaller fishing 
operations are also more efficient because, thanks to being far less capital 
intensive, they are able to adapt to seasonal and longer-term variations in fish 
stocks that prove quite harmful to larger, less flexible operations (Barrett et al. 
1984). Barrett et al. sum up the deep inequities in how the government approaches 
the problems in the fishing industry in their conclusion that, “the Task Force’s 
recommendations are intent on providing a brighter, more certain future for the 
corporate sector – all at a direct cost to independent fishermen, small fish 
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processors, and many fisheries-dependent coastal communities” (Barrett 1984: 
134). Though Barrett et al. and others brought these criticisms several years 
before the infamous collapse of the cod stocks, it is clear that these researchers 
recognized that the current fishery policies employed by the government were not 
only deeply inequitable, but also placing the entire industry on the road to 
disaster.  
This inequitable, uneven power dynamic operated, even in the heart of a 
wealthy, First World country. Though this section has focused on Canadian 
fisheries, a similar dynamic played out in the New England fishery, with the 
major difference being that the United States is a less generous welfare state, so 
struggling on-shore fishing communities received less government assistance. In 
each case there was, according to Davis et al., a “failure of those existing political 
structures to allow adequately for the small boat fishermen’s participation and 
control of decision-making which affects their own fate” (Davis et al. 1984: 121).  
In hindsight, it seems that the only stakeholders who saw this coming were 
the on-shore fishermen, whose catches began to decline years before the collapse 
was officially recognized. Kurlansky points out that, “in the 1980s, government 
scientists had ignored the cry of inshore fishermen that the cod were 
disappearing” and says that the predictions of small boat fishermen that the 
offshore trawlers were devastating the cod populations turned out to be 
unfortunately accurate (Kurlansky 1997: 3). What happened in the Northwest 
Atlantic cod fishery is a prime example of inequalities in governance precipitating 
an environmental, and consequently social, disaster.  
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Collapse 
How did this happen?  
How did one of the world’s most prolific (and managed) fisheries collapse 
so suddenly? The same policies that left the on-shore fishery at such a tremendous 
disadvantage compared to the off-shore fishery, also set up the collapse of the cod 
population. Privileging the industrial fleet did more than harm coastal 
communities; it allowed the giant off-shore trawlers to destroy the habitat of vital 
fish species and harvest unsustainable levels of fish. Even though the worst 
environmental damage was done by the off-shore fleets, the sector of the industry 
that suffered most was the in-shore fishery. Small boat fishermen had been 
expressing their concerns about the catches of the industrial fleets for years, and 
they were some of the first to notice that stocks seemed to be in trouble (Ommer 
1985), but their voices were barely heard above the din of economic growth. It 
was only after the collapse that their concerns were given credibility.  
Rosemary Ommer, in an effort to understand the collapse and look for 
ways to deal with it going forward, approaches her examination of the fishery 
with the adage, “history teaches us that men and nations behave wisely once they 
have exhausted all other alternatives” (Ommer 1994: 5). She blames the 
overcapacity in the industry created with the establishment of the EEZ and the 
associated overly optimistic expectations of the fishery for precipitating the 
collapse. The government, as well as fisheries scientists and managers, allowed, 
and in many cases encouraged this growth through subsidies and other incentives, 
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which “contributed to the stress on the resource and raised expectations that could 
not be fulfilled” (Ommer 1994: 14). Most of the excess capacity was in the 
industrial, off-shore fleet which meant that this was not a case of “too many 
fishers catching too few fish” but rather “too much technology destroying too 
many fish” (Ommer 1994: 7). Increased technology and increased effort also 
maintained catches, even as the historically productive areas became depleted. 
The catch figures of the off-shore operations hid for managers what was clear to 
many on-shore fishers who watched their catches dwindle: the fishery was in 
trouble. Therefore, Ommer concludes, whatever efforts are made going forward 
must include the voices of on-shore fishermen, as they were the first ones to 
notice something was wrong, and the first ones to be adversely affected. She 
argues that, “at last there is something on which we all- fisher, government 
bureaucrat, politician and academic- now agree, and it is this: the manner in 
which we have thought about fisheries management in the past is demonstrably 
untenable” (Ommer 1994: 18), echoing the conclusion McEvoy reached after 
examining the collapse of California’s fisheries many years before.  
 
Impact 
Kurlansky writes of Newfoundland’s only remaining cod fishery, the 
Sentinel Fishery, which allows a few small boat fisherman to catch a very limited 
number of cod for scientific purposes, releasing some with tags for tracking and 
killing others for research on age and sex. The very little bit of fresh cod meat this 
fishery yields is the only taste Newfoundlanders get of the fish that was a staple of 
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their diets for centuries, and the boats are often greeted on shore by lines of 
people. During one expedition in early autumn, what was once a very lucrative 
fishing season, one Sentinel boat caught 100 cod, weighing a total of only 375 
pounds; before the collapse of Newfoundland’s cod stocks, that same small 
fishing boat might have caught 300 fish weighing more than 3,000 pounds 
(Kurlansky 1997: 13). For a region that has been almost entirely dependent on its 
cod fishery for hundreds of years, this is certainly a sad state of affairs.  
 
A fishing community in Newfoundland (from Encyclopedia Britannica) 
 
Up and down the coasts of New England and Canada, the question in 
fishing communities is when the cod will come back; few fishermen want to 
admit that the cod populations may never recover. One obstacle has been the 
“perception problem” where people’s memories are short, and they want so much 
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to believe that the cod are coming back that they see any sign of progress as an 
indicator that the fishery can reopen. As one Canadian scientist remarked in 1996, 
“we found 15,000 cod in the South Bay, and everyone said the cod are back. Hold 
on! Ten years ago, the biomass, the population, was 1.2 million” (Kurlansky 
1997: 195). This has placed political pressure on managers and made it even more 
difficult to craft a sensible fisheries policy going forward.  
Certainly the cod collapse had some impact on the international economy 
and industrial, off-shore fleets, and it caused international alarm. However, those 
who really suffered were the on-shore fishermen. They couldn’t fish elsewhere 
and most did not have the capital or the skills to move into another industry. The 
on-shore fishermen were the ones hit hardest by a disaster caused by a series of 
decisions from which they were excluded. And it wasn’t just the fishermen 
themselves who experienced hardship; it was whole communities that were built 
around and dependent on the fishing industry.  As the 2003 PEW Oceans 
Commission report explains, “when fishing incomes decline, entire communities 
suffer. A variety of socioeconomic impacts resulting from depleted fish stocks 
ripple through local, regional, and national fishing economies. Local businesses 
that benefit from fishing income also suffer. A host of less visible social problems 
often accompanies such economic distress” (PEW 2003: 10). Like the economic 
dislocations caused by the deindustrialization of the “rust belt,” struggling fishing 
towns face the unenviable situation of having to turn away from what has long 
been their economic staple. In New Bedford, Massachusetts, and other struggling 
fishing ports throughout New England and eastern Canada, Family Fishing 
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Assistance Centers, and similar networks of nonprofits and aid organizations, are 
helping thousands of fishermen, fisheries workers, and their families leave the 
fishing industry in search of more stable employment. Few fishermen, either those 
leaving the industry or those staying to tough it out, are particularly optimistic that 
things will get better. “The management process has overlooked the 
people…[they want] to see the environment and the fish stocks protected, [and 
they want] equal consideration for fishing communities” (PEW 2003: 13).  
 
Conclusion 
 Unequal power dynamics, where politically marginalized on-shore 
fishermen’s interests are at odds with politically and economically powerful 
corporate, industrial off-shore fleets, allowed unsustainable exploitation of the 
Northwest Atlantic’s cod fisheries. Those whose livelihoods were most dependent 
on this once abundant resource were the ones with the least say in the decision 
making process that lead to its decimation. The on-shore fishermen did not benefit 
from the overly intensive, industrial fishing of the northwest Atlantic and they 
were the ones who suffered the consequences when the fish stocks collapsed. 
Many on-shore fishermen’s, and indeed whole communities’ livelihoods 
are destroyed, and many are having to rely on government assistance; however, 
Canada, and to a lesser extent the United States are able to cushion the blow for 
their citizens, and it is unlikely that anyone is actually going to starve. As 
Kurlansky points out in describing the long lines that often form for the scant 
catch from the Sentinel fisheries in Newfoundland, “this is Canada. These people 
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have jobs or are on public assistance, mostly the latter these days. They are not 
hungry but simply yearning for a taste of their local dish. The big fish companies, 
the ones that owned bottom draggers that had cleaned out the last of the cod 
before the moratorium, now import frozen cod…but these people are accustomed 
to fresh, white, flaky cod” (Kurlansky 1997: 13). And, this, the situation of those 
who suffer most from the loss of the fishery, is where the cases of the Northwest 
Atlantic and West Africa, are distinctly different, as the next chapter will discuss. 
As chapter four will show, the processes and power dynamics in the Northwest 
Atlantic and West Africa are starkly similar, but the social consequences of 
depleting the West African fisheries will be far more severe.  
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FOUR 
WEST AFRICA’S FISHERIES 
Fisheries are not usually the first resource that comes to mind when 
resource conflict in West Africa is mentioned. Oil and diamonds are far more 
commonly discussed and receive exponentially more media attention. However, 
fisheries are a valuable and important resource for the coastal region of West 
Africa, and have been so for hundreds of years (Marquette et al. 2002). 
Traditionally, coastal communities have relied on fisheries for their main source 
of protein as well as their livelihoods, and this pattern continues in many places 
up and down the coast today. However, local fishermen are no longer the only 
ones fishing off of West Africa’s coast; foreign industrial fleets are taking huge 
catches for international markets each year. Long seen as one of the world’s last 
remaining productive fisheries, the West African fish populations are starting to 
show signs of severe stress from overfishing. The overexploitation of this 
resource threatens more than just the ecology of the region; it is having very 
serious social and economic impacts on an already unstable region, and the 
region’s poor are being especially hard hit. If, or as many experts say, when, the 
West African fish populations collapse under the same pressures that other 
fisheries world wide have succumbed to, an already struggling region of Africa 
will face further social and economic hardship. In this chapter I seek to examine 
what is happening here, what processes are at work, and how this is affecting the 
region. I will argue that the situation in West Africa is a serious matter of 
environmental justice, and that the patterns emerging are strikingly similar to 
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what happened in the Northwest Atlantic. However, because of this case is in the 
Third World, what will happen to the millions of Africans who rely on this fishery 
will be quite different. 
 
Fisheries as a resource 
Ecology 
 Africa’s west coast, from Mauritania south all the way to Congo, consists 
of rich and incredibly diverse marine ecosystems. The warm tropical waters are 
home to many fish species, from the locally important sardinella, to 
internationally sought tuna species.  
West Africa (from  http://www.afropop.org/explore/show_region/ID/1) 
 
This region’s environment sustains so many fish because the West African 
continental shelf is a site of ocean upwelling. Cooler, nutrient rich water rises to 
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the surface sparking growth of phytoplankton, zooplankton, and other tiny 
organisms forming the base of the food web. This in turn supports a variety of 
larger species, many of which have commercial value. Typically, there are two 
main upwelling events each year, one minor in December and January and one 
major in late July, August, and September (Marquette et al. 2002).  Fish 
populations fluctuate and migrate through the year, influenced by the upwelling 
events and normal fluctuations of the Guinea Current which runs along the coast. 
Evidence suggests that conditions off the west coast of Africa are strongly 
influenced by El Niño Southern Oscillation events in the Pacific Ocean, as well as 
variations in rainfall and climate on the African continent (Perry and Sumaila 
2007). Thanks to variable global weather patterns and their seemingly direct 
impact on the environment in the east Atlantic, the West African fisheries 
experience wide variability not only on the scale of months, but over several 
seasons and even decades. Different species prosper in different oceanic 
conditions, and research has shown that a drop in abundance of one set of species 
due to a change in climatic conditions often corresponds to a rise of another 
species favored by those changes (Perry and Sumaila 2007). 
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Phytoplankton, stimulated by upwelling off the coast of Mauritania (from NASA) 
 
The West African continental shelf is home to hundreds of species of fish, 
cephalopods, crustaceans, and other marine creatures including turtles (Perry and 
Sumaila 2007). Some of the most commonly fished species are sardinella, 
anchovy, triggerfish, grouper, bream, octopus, shrimp, lobster, shellfish including 
scallops, and several species of tuna (Perry and Sumaila 2007). Although over-
harvesting and habitat destruction by the fishing industry is the primary concern 
here, the marine ecosystem of West Africa is also threatened by pollution from 
urban centers, agriculture, mining and oil production, and global warming.  
 
Local importance 
 The rich ecosystem of Africa’s continental shelf has supported large 
fishing communities for centuries, and today most of the region’s citizens live 
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within one hundred kilometers of the coast (Marquette et al. 2002, Perry and 
Sumaila 2007). Most countries still have large artisanal fishing fleets; these 
fishermen still fish from canoes using various forms of nets and lines. The work is 
labor intensive, involving many community members, both male and female, and 
often employing entire families. Traditionally, coastal populations fish both for 
subsistence and for business. They rely on the fish they catch for protein and 
nutrition, and as their main source of income. Usually the male members of a 
community are the fishermen, but the women are in charge of processing and 
reselling the fish. Fish caught in this way feed people well beyond the borders of 
the fishing villages, often contributing an important, and less expensive, source of 
protein for those in urban centers and inland areas. It is estimated that West 
Africans consume an average of twenty to twenty two kilograms of fish per 
person per year, compared to around eight kilograms per person elsewhere in 
Africa, making fish an extremely important source of protein in the region (Dioh 
1998, Perry and Sumaila 2007).  Few residents can afford more expensive 
alternatives to this vital dietary staple such as bushmeat (wild animal) or domestic 
meat; a 1998 report stated that it is typical for fish to be one third the cost of a 
comparative amount of beef (Dioh 1998). Therefore, the health, as well as 
economic and social situations, of millions of West Africans is connected to the 
state of the region’s fisheries.  
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International importance 
 As discussed earlier in this thesis, fish have been an important 
international commodity since the 1600s (if not earlier), but their importance has 
grown in recent years. The twentieth century has seen seemingly inexhaustible 
fish stocks collapse around the world and, simultaneously, an ever growing 
demand for seafood. As species of fish become rarer they also become more 
valuable, providing even more incentive for those enterprising fishermen and 
companies who can afford to do so to invest in all the latest fishing technology 
and head for the remote corners of the sea in search of under-exploited fishing 
grounds (Whitty 2006). Having depleted their own once abundant stocks, 
European, American, and Asian fishing fleets have turned to the Third World in 
search of more fish to satisfy increasing demand. Africa is a popular destination 
for these fleets, and the rich, relatively underexploited waters of West Africa have 
attracted the attention of large, foreign industrial fleets. Residents of traditionally 
seafood eating nations in the First World continue to demand seafood and are 
often unaware that their shrimp scampi, tuna salad, and fish ‘n chips come from 
the waters of struggling Third World countries. Increasingly the quest to satiate 
global demand for seafood is straining the vitally important fisheries of places like 
West Africa. The depletion of these fish stocks pits the local populations that 
depend on them against a wealthy global market willing to pay exorbitant prices 
for the very fish poorer Africans desperately need (Kaczynski and Fluharty 2002, 
Clover 2006).  
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Foreign fishing activities in and off the 200 mile EEZ of the Sub-Saharan West African 
States (from Kaczynski and Fluharty, 2002) 
 
Governance 
International fisheries governance 
 As mentioned in chapter two, in the late 1970s the international 
community devised a new system of ocean territorial boundaries and governance 
stipulating that each country has economic rights to the ocean shelf for two 
hundred miles off its coast. This area is known as the country’s Exclusive 
Economic Zone (EEZ). Whatever resources lie within that zone, whether they be 
fisheries, oil deposits, or other resources, belong to that country to exploit and 
manage for themselves; they can sell the rights to resources within their EEZs just 
as they can with any other resources. EEZs were devised in an effort to give Third 
World countries more control over their coastal resources, because during the 
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1970s many poor nations, especially in South America resented that their fisheries 
and resources were being exploited by wealthy foreign fleets and they were 
powerless to prevent it (Mansfield 2001a). Extending territorial rights was 
supposed to give struggling nations more power over their own resources and 
allow them to benefit from those resources. Ironically, the very system that was 
supposed to benefit developing nations has made them more vulnerable and has 
allowed industrialized nations to exploit those natural resources (Mansfield 2004). 
Nations like the US, Japan, and European countries under the European Union 
have made various arrangements with countries in South America, Africa, and 
parts of Asia to exploit their “under-utilized resources.” 
 In West Africa the primary exploiter of African nations’ EEZs has been 
the European Union. The EU negotiates “cooperation” agreements with the cash-
strapped governments of African nations allowing EU member states to fish in 
African waters. For a relatively low price, industrial European fishing fleets are 
able to gain access to African waters, often with few restrictions; those 
restrictions and conditions that are put in place in the agreements are rarely 
enforced. The European fleets remove large quantities of fish from African waters 
with their advanced technology and huge ships. Often, no processing occurs on 
African shores and no African fishermen are employed by the European boats 
(Kaczynski and Fluharty 2002). EU boats are often expected to police themselves 
since the African governments involved do not have the money or power to 
enforce even the lenient regulations that exist.  
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 The way harvesting capacity is often regulated in such agreements 
provides an excellent example of the way these arrangement are structured to 
maximize EU profit while avoiding any control by West African states. 
According to Kaczynski and Fluharty (2002) fishing agreements between the EU 
and West African nations regulate capacity by gross registered tonnage (GRT) 
which is a measure of vessel size, and which has very little relation to actual 
capacity to harvest fish. Combined with the fact that EU fleet operators, not West 
African officials, are given the authority to make most decisions regarding 
regulation of the fleet, this means that “[the] EU is in position to manage the 
intensity and patterns of coastal resource exploitation practically without any 
consultation with the coastal state” (Kaczynski and Fluharty 2002: 78) 
 The first of the two figures that follow shows the size of the EU fishing 
fleet authorized to operate in the waters of five West African nations, by GRT and 
the number of tuna boats, and the yearly compensation each nation receives from 
the EU for this use of their EEZ. The second figure shows the FAO fish capture 
statistics for those same countries, for the past five decades, as well as each 
country’s population and coastline. 
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Size of fishing fleets authorized to operate in coastal waters of West African states by 
agreements and yearly compensations paid by the EU between 1981 and 2006 (from 
Kaczynski and Fluharty 2002) 
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Mauritania 
 
Population: ~3 million 
Coastline: 720 km 
 
Senegal 
 
Population: ~10 million 
Coastline: 718 km 
 
The Gambia 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Guinea-Bissau 
 
Population: ~1.2 million 
Coastline: 274 km 
 
 
 
Guinea 
 
Population: ~8.5 million 
Coastline: 300 km 
 
 
Population: ~1.5 million 
Coastline: 70 km 
 
FAO Capture Production Fishery Statistics 
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As these figures show, these are relatively small countries with relatively 
little coastline, and yet a tremendous amount of fish is extracted from their waters 
each year, much of it by European fishing fleets. However, because of a lack of 
regulation and chronic under-reporting, we don’t know exactly how many fish 
European fleets are actually catching. It is clear from the proceeding figures that 
GRT, yearly compensation, and the state of the fishery are not connected in EU 
policy towards West African fisheries.  For example, Senegal has allowed the EU 
to fish in its waters since 1979, but intense fishing meant that, according to the 
FAO, catches peaked ten years ago. Nevertheless, a new, rather dubious 
agreement was signed in 2002 with some new features to appease the Senegalese 
government (such as a requirement that a certain amount of the tuna catch must be 
processed in Senegal each year), but overall lacking in conservation measures or 
limitations on catches (Clover 2006). The fishing industry in Senegal employs 
over 600,000 people, some in the country’s own industrial fleet, and many others 
in the small scale operations that fish from canoes, called pirogues, and many of 
them stand to be negatively impacted by this agreement (Clover 2006). Clover 
maintains that members of Senegal’s industrial fishery “question the legality of 
the access agreement now that stocks are clearly overfished, and the artisanal 
fishermen are angry that the agreement was signed behind their backs” (Clover 
2006: 50). Despite the agreement’s unpopularity, Senegal’s government signed it 
because, as one official emphasized, for a country as poor as Senegal, $75 million 
is a lot of money (Clover 2006).  Kaczynski and Fluharty (2002) express concern 
that not only are the Senegalese people left with the environmental consequences 
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and social disruptions, once the fishery stops producing fish for the EU, this 
important stream of revenue will dry up and Senegal will be left far worse off 
than before, with nothing to show for years of cooperation with the EU.  
In Guinea-Bissau, in addition to exploiting the tiny nation’s only 
significant resource and a potential economic asset, EU policies are actually 
inhibiting development and perpetuating dependency on fishing agreements. The 
EU avoids investment in Guinea-Bissau because it is seen as “risky” and there is a 
perception that use of the fishery is the only thing the country has to offer. This 
means that fisheries agreements remain the chief source of government revenues, 
over forty-five percent, making the government even more beholden to the EU 
(Kaczynski and Fluharty 2002) and leaving them with no leverage in negotiating 
agreements. Worse, when the fishery begins to decline (FAO data indicates that 
this may already be happening) the country will be left stripped of a resource that 
could have acted as a stepping-stone to development and welfare improvement, 
and with nothing to fall back on. In both cases, and indeed in most West African 
countries, as was the case in the Northwest Atlantic, those most reliant on the 
fishery have little or no say in its regulation as the source of their livelihoods is 
exploited and destroyed for someone else’s short term gain, and are left with the 
long term consequences.  
The policy guidelines of the European Union state that EU relations with 
the developing world should “reduce poverty and promote sustainable 
development” (Kaczynski and Fluharty 2002). However, this guideline is 
obviously not being followed in European fisheries policy. By negotiating these 
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exploitive fisheries agreements with West African nations, the EU is in direct 
violation of its own stated goals, but when confronted with the conflict, European 
officials and industry spokesmen have maintained that fisheries policy is “just 
business” and therefore has nothing to do with development policy (Kaczynski 
and Fluharty 2002). This thin excuse is hardly justification for taking large 
quantities of vitally important fish (and therefore protein) from African waters in 
order to turn a profit.  
 
National fisheries governance 
The setting out of Exclusive Economic Zones put the control of such 
zones and the fisheries within them that had been in the control of local coastal 
communities in the hands of national governments (Mansfield 2004). 
International fisheries agreements, in particular ones granting access to fishing 
grounds within a nation’s EEZ, are negotiated with national governments. In the 
case of West Africa, the national governments which negotiate the agreements are 
not the most important stakeholders. The small-scale local fishermen do not have 
a say, and therefore the agreements often barely take into account potential impact 
on African fisheries. In West Africa few national governments have the human, 
technological, or financial resources available to properly monitor, let alone 
manage, fisheries, which means that even though those governments technically 
have jurisdiction in their EEZs, they usually have little power to regulate local 
fisheries, and even less to police international fishing fleets in their waters.  
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Regulating artisanal fisheries is challenging due to the sheer numbers of 
boats and fishermen and the often informal and migratory nature of artisanal 
fishing communities and structures. Common measures to regulate domestic 
fishing include bans on specific types of gear and fishing methods, requiring 
licenses, and regulating net mesh size (Perry and Sumaila 2007). In those West 
African nations that do have domestic industrial fleets, like Senegal, such fleets 
tend to be under-regulated, and once again, enforcement tends to be lax. Poor 
regulation of domestic fleets can also serve as a loophole for foreign companies; 
in many countries ships may be registered to a citizen, but the ship and crew are 
foreign and the harvest is sold at foreign markets (Clover 2006).  Industrial fleets 
are difficult to regulate because most of what they do occurs far offshore, and in 
the case of the foreign fleets, the numbers and capacities of the industrial fleets 
drastically exceed and overwhelm those of the African governments attempting to 
police them. National governments have slightly more success regulating their 
own domestic fisheries, though as Marquette et al. (2002) note, regulating 
artisanal fisheries is of far less value than properly limiting and policing the more 
damaging industrial fleets, both foreign and domestic. Though it often falls on 
national governments to regulate the fisheries within their borders, those in West 
Africa lack the resources, and often political will, to oversee the monitoring and 
regulation of this valuable resource. This regulatory structure allows national 
governments to negotiate away rights to their EEZs without having to take on any 
of the responsibilities jurisdiction over those zones is supposed to entail.  
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Recent fisheries agreements often contain some limitations (usually easily 
avoided) on international fleets in territorial waters. These limitations usually 
involve limiting licenses, limiting tonnage of fishing boats in a fleet and various 
forms of quota systems, most of which are structured to allow the EU to 
maximize their access to the fisheries. Such restrictions are unevenly and laxly 
enforced at best (Kaczynski and Fluharty 2002). For example, in the waters of 
Senegal, European fishing boats officially report catches of 13,200 tons of fish 
landed per year, but some estimate that the actual number landed is closer to 
88,000 to 110,000 tons per year (Clover 2006).  Kaczynski and Fluharty claim 
that even if they were properly instituted such limited regulations would not 
adequately protect the environment, fish stocks, or local fishermen from harm.  
 
Local fisheries governance 
In many of the region’s coastal villages, fishing is done from wooden 
canoes, some powered by small motors, others powered by sails and oars. These 
boats are usually crewed by male family members using a variety of gear 
including set nets, drift nets, purse seines, and beach seines, as well as some hand 
nets and lines, depending on where they are fishing, what they are fishing for, and 
what types of gear are available and affordable (Marquette et al. 2002, Perry and 
Sumaila 2007).   
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Fishing boats in Ghana (photo by Michael Sarver) 
While fishermen themselves are usually men, women are also heavily 
involved in the fishing economy. Once the fish is brought to shore, the women, 
usually wives and female relatives of the fishermen, take over. Women are 
responsible for all processing and marketing of fish, including cleaning, salting or 
drying (in a few cases freezing), and selling at local markets (Marquette et al. 
2002). This type of fishery is certainly small scale, but the people in the 
community do not fish purely for subsistence; much of what they catch is sold at 
market to local residents, and to those in urban and/or inland areas. For thousands 
of coastal communities throughout West Africa, fish are an important resource for 
their health, economic well-being, and society.  
As is the case with small-scale fisheries in many regions, West Africa’s 
local fishing communities have definite, though informal, institutions of 
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governance. It is often assumed by fisheries managers and bureaucrats that 
“common fisheries” are unregulated and open to all, but in many instances, that is 
simply not the case. Marquette et al. also describe the governance structures of 
such communities, using the example of coastal villages in Ghana. Fishing 
communities in Ghana usually have a leader or chief figure who serves as an 
informal regulator of the fishery and mitigates any disputes that arise. This person 
is consulted on important matters not only by the members of the community, but 
also by leaders of other communities, and often by local government officials as 
well. These informal regulating structures become especially important during 
variations in environmental conditions and fish stocks. Over the years local 
fishing communities have adapted to the fluctuations and changes in the fish 
populations, and due to these governance structures have been fairly resilient to 
natural environmental variation. However, as industrial fleets are adding even 
more pressure to the system, and threatening those fish stocks the small-scale 
fishermen and their communities rely on, there is concern about the ability of 
local governance structures to continue to mitigate the effects (Perry and Sumaila 
2007). 
 West African fishermen have also developed other coping strategies to 
deal with fluctuations in fish populations, though it is unclear how well these 
adaptations will work in the face of a dramatic decline in fish populations. When 
fish stocks are low fishermen diversify their incomes by taking on other forms of 
work (often repairing boats and gear), and when possible, will switch to another, 
more abundant species of fish. If neither of these options is feasible, fishermen 
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migrate, usually seasonally though sometimes for longer periods of time, and 
sometimes taking their entire family (and therefore fishing operation) with them. 
Even when they migrate to villages of different ethnic groups and other countries, 
these fishermen integrate into the local fishing community, respect local 
institutions, and create new institutions of their own (Marquette et al. 2002). 
While this kind of migration and other coping strategies have worked well as 
methods of dealing with natural fluctuations in fish stocks, they may not be viable 
options as West African fisheries decline from intense fishing pressures.  
 Local governance structures in this region are largely unofficial, and often 
unwritten, sets of rules and customs, as discussed above, but they should not be 
ignored or brushed aside. Too often fisheries managers ignore these kinds of local 
governance, assuming artisanal and small scale fishermen have no knowledge of 
or desire to protect the resource their livelihoods depend on (Lawson and 
Robinson 1983). National and international decisions and processes seriously 
undermine local governance and the communities where such governance is at 
work. By granting foreign fleets access to West African fisheries, national and 
international actors have opened heavily used fish stocks up to additional 
pressures, and forced small scale local operations to compete with large 
international fleets and companies. As will be discussed in the next chapter, the 
governance structures in place at the local level have implications for policy 
making at the national and international levels, and may help in developing more 
practical ways to protect fisheries over the long term.   
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Impact on West Africa 
 The ecological impact of international, national, and local demands on 
West Africa’s fisheries is becoming increasingly severe. Though still in much 
better shape than many fisheries in Europe and North America, it is believed that 
the West African fishery is under great stress and in danger of collapse. Daniel 
Pauly, a preeminent authority on fisheries decline world-wide, estimated that 
since 1945, West Africa’s abundant fisheries have declined at least fifty percent 
(Clover 2006), which means fifty percent less fish for local fishermen to catch as 
they compete with international fleets. Perry and Sumaila (2007) suggest that 
many species have declined fifty percent in only two decades, including shrimp, 
octopus, and some demersal species, and they point out that estimates of total 
decline tend to hide the shifts in composition of species brought on by fishing-
induced changes in the ecosystem. Pressure from local fleets has surely played 
some role in this, but a great deal of the strain on West African fisheries comes 
from foreign, industrialized, technologically advanced fleets. The size of 
industrial fishing boats allows them to fish far from home, and technology like 
GPS, radar, and “fish finders” allow these fleets to fish in areas that were 
previously inaccessible to smaller scale operations which had provided fish stocks 
with a place to regenerate. These industrial fishing technologies that have allowed 
Europeans and others to over harvest their own waters are also placing West 
African fisheries at risk.  
Trawls, longlines, and drift nets, all operated by powerful machinery, take 
more fish from the ocean in a few hours than a small scale operation can take in 
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days. These technologies cause additional ecological harm through their levels of 
bycatch and habitat destruction. They not only capture large quantities of the fish 
they were intended to catch, they also snare juveniles which are too small to keep 
and/or have not had a chance to reproduce, and other species of ecological, and 
sometimes commercial importance. Most of this bycatch, which makes up 
roughly a quarter of total biomass caught (sometimes more depending on the nets 
used and species caught) is thrown back into the ocean dead and dying, and is not 
reported or included in catch totals (Kaczynski and Fluharty 2002, Whitty 2006). 
Bycatch from a shrimp trawler (from National Geographic) 
 
 Trawling also devastates marine habitat, making it much more difficult for 
depleted fish stocks, and the marine ecosystem as a whole, to recover. The impact 
of trawling on marine environments is commonly compared to the impact of clear 
cutting on rainforests.  Considering the ecological damage caused by the 
industrial fishing fleets in West African waters, it is not surprising that the 
region’s once productive fisheries are yielding smaller catches, smaller individual 
fish, and fewer commercially important species, even with increased fishing 
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efforts. Unfortunately, common small scale fishermen’s reactions to the effects of 
overfishing in their waters tend to make their own situations even worse. Their 
initial coping strategy is to fish harder, work longer hours, venture farther from 
their usual grounds, and harvest more and more of the remaining fish (Perry and 
Sumaila 2007). It is not uncommon for desperate fishermen to turn to more 
destructive fishing methods, including using dynamite and cyanide, thereby 
compounding the damage done by industrial fishing fleets to the coastal 
ecosystem.  
Senegalese pirogues and trawlers often compete on the same fishing grounds (from National 
Geographic) 
  
The health of local fishing communities is closely tied to the health of the 
fishery resources they depend on, so as West African fish stocks decline, the 
coastal regions suffer. At the most basic level, fishermen must either fish harder 
and invest more time, energy and money for dwindling catches or give up fishing 
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in favor of another line of work. Many have spent their whole lives fishing, and 
have little education and few other marketable skills, and often there are few other 
jobs available (Allison and Horemans 2006). Foreign fishing fleets rarely employ 
local workers, and the fish those fleets catch is almost never processed on African 
shores, so no new jobs replace those lost in the small scale fishing fleets 
(Kaczynski and Fluharty 2002). Perry and Sumaila say that in Ghana alone, 
roughly 100,000 jobs were lost in only four years (1992-1996) due to 
corresponding declines in fish catches and rising fuel costs, which made fishing 
via motorized canoe uneconomical (Perry and Sumaila 2007). The women who 
process and market the fish also suffer as fisheries decline, which often means 
that entire families are deprived of their livelihoods (Perry and Sumaila 2007). 
Associated sectors of the economy that supply fishermen or rely on their catch are 
also adversely affected. People in fishing communities, whether fishermen or not, 
are heavily reliant on fish for protein and nutrition, so as fish become scarce, 
prices go up, and as an important sector of the economy declines, the entire 
community is affected directly. 
 The impact of overfishing in West African waters does not end at the 
coastal fishing villages however. Since fish has traditionally been the cheapest 
and most abundant source of protein, citizens of urban centers and inland areas far 
away from fishing communities also rely on fish for food. The poorest people are 
hurt first by rising prices and fewer fish, and since they often cannot afford 
alternatives, they risk malnutrition and hunger. The impact of the loss of a once 
abundant and important food source hits many people however, not just the poor, 
 
 
80 
and can reverberate through the local and regional economies. The social 
structures and economies of coastal fishing communities are seriously 
undermined by the loss of their main source of income and food, and these are the 
areas hardest hit by overfishing. However, the impact doesn’t stop there, since a 
shortage and/or price increase of a staple food item touches the lives of many, 
many people, and can have far reaching consequences for the economy and social 
fabric of a region.  
 The parts of West Africa that will be hit hardest by continuing declines in 
fish stocks are also those areas that are least able to cope with the consequences. 
Governments of too many countries in this region lack the ability to ease the blow 
of failing fisheries for their citizens, just as they lack the power to properly 
manage those vital fish stocks in the first place. The story of declining fisheries 
resources due to exploitation for international markets follows closely the pattern 
set by many other stories of resource exploitation in West Africa and other 
regions. The major difference is that West Africa’s fisheries are far more essential 
to the daily lives of West Africans, both those in coastal communities and 
elsewhere, than resources like diamonds and oil.  
 
Conclusion 
 West Africa’s fisheries are an important resource with local and 
international value; however, global demand seriously threatens local access to, 
and use of, this vital resource. As mentioned several times in this chapter, data on 
this region’s fisheries can be difficult to obtain and is often inaccurate. Fisheries 
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management is challenging enough with accurate data, and this makes the case of 
West Africa even more difficult, and urgent, to address. The decline of West 
African fisheries means the region will face increased malnutrition, 
unemployment and poverty, negatively impacting the already struggling economy 
and social fabric. West Africa is certainly not the only region where the loss of 
important fisheries is a serious problem, but West Africa is one of the regions that 
is and will continue to be hardest hit by the global fisheries crisis, and is least able 
to cope with its consequences.  
The processes underway in West Africa are eerily similar to those that 
precipitated the collapse of the cod fishery in the Northwest Atlantic, however, as 
will be discussed in the next chapter, the social impact will be far more serious 
because these nations are for the most part unable to soften the blow to their 
citizens, and lives, not just livelihoods, are likely to be in jeopardy.  
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FIVE: 
CONCLUSION 
 The preceding chapters have examined the depletion of marine fisheries, 
as a resource, from a geographical perspective, and argued that this is an issue of 
environmental justice. Chapter two dissected the concept of overfishing into its 
political and economic, and physical and technological components. This allowed 
me to analyze the processes, ideas, management strategies, governance structures, 
and other forces that have lead to fisheries collapses all over the world. I then laid 
out why the global fisheries crisis is an issue of environmental justice. Chapter 
three looked at the collapse of the prolific cod stocks in New England and Eastern 
Canada, examining the unequal power relations that precipitated this disaster, and 
its highly uneven impact. This is certainly a case of Third World power dynamics 
occurring in the First World. Chapter four then looked at what is happening in 
West Africa’s fisheries with a similar view. The processes and power relations are 
quite similar, but the impact of a collapse will be far more devastating. This last 
chapter will review the social and economic causes and consequences of this 
environmental problem and provide a comparative analysis of the two case 
studies, pointing out their many similarities, as well as their crucial difference. 
From there I will discuss what we can learn from this, both in terms of fisheries 
policy going forward, and in issues of environmental justice and natural resource 
use more generally.  
 The cases of the Northwest Atlantic and West Africa demonstrate the 
dynamics at work in the depletion of each region’s once abundant fishery. Though 
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the regions are very different in almost every way, from climate, to culture, to 
political and economic situation, their cases do share a striking similarity: the 
processes that have combined to deplete their fisheries. In both cases unequal 
power relations, at the local and national levels leave the small scale fisheries at a 
serious disadvantage. In the Northwest Atlantic, small scale on-shore fishermen 
lack the economic importance and associated political clout of the corporate, 
industrial, off-shore operations. The disorganized, diverse nature of the small 
scale fishery also makes it harder for them to make their voices heard, and have 
their concerns addressed. St. Martin (2006) says that sometimes the interests of 
on-shore fishermen are even undermined by their own arguments about what was 
at stake: their focus on livelihoods and communities reinforces perceptions of the 
fishery as old-fashioned and un-economic. In West Africa, again, small scale 
fishermen are usually poor and politically marginalized within their own 
countries, so their interests are not at the forefront of national policies. And, West 
African nations are at a serious disadvantage in negotiating access to their 
fisheries resources with wealthy, powerful, First World nations. These unequal 
power relations leave small scale fishermen with little or no say in a decision-
making process that profoundly affects them. In each case governance structures 
at the local level are undermined by those favoring industrial, capital intensive, 
large scale operations, resulting in environmental and social devastation for those 
whose livelihoods depend on the small scale fishery.  
 The difference between these cases then, is all in the impact of fisheries 
depletion. True, many Northwest Atlantic fishing communities that had relied on 
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cod have been economically and socially devastated. That cannot be denied and 
their plight should not be ignored or downplayed. However, as Kurlansky (1997) 
aptly reminds us in the case of Newfoundland, the livelihoods of Canadians and 
Americans may have been destroyed, but they are not going to starve. Because 
these are First World communities, though they may have been victims to a 
dynamic more commonly associated with the Third World, their strong, wealthy 
governments are able to protect them from the devastating poverty found in the 
Third World. In West Africa, the governments do not have that ability. They lack 
the financial resources to aid their already struggling populations if and when 
their fish stocks fail. Therefore, while the scene in fishing communities up and 
down the Northwest Atlantic coast is one of economic and social plight, it is far 
milder than what is setting up to transpire in West Africa.  
 Even though environmental justice is more commonly associated with the 
Southern United States, more broadly it involves issues of unequal power 
relations and inequitable distributions of environmental costs and benefits. In the 
case of fisheries depletion, those who depend on the fishery for their livelihoods 
are politically and economically marginal and thus have little say in 
environmental decision-making. These unequal power dynamics, between people 
and places create a situation where a socially vital resource is exploited and 
degraded by industrial, corporate (and in some cases, foreign) fleets, and small 
scale fishing operations are left to suffer the consequences when that resource is 
depleted. This is what makes global fisheries depletion an issue of environmental 
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justice, in First Cases like the Northwest Atlantic, and Third World cases like 
West Africa.  
 
Policy Implications 
 A clear understanding of the processes at work at local, national, and 
international levels and just what is at stake is absolutely essential to 
understanding the collapse of Northwest Atlantic cod fisheries and the decline of 
West African fisheries. Any effective policy measures will have to take local, 
global, short term, long term, environmental, economic, and social considerations 
into account in order to effectively mitigate the over-exploitation of this valuable, 
and potentially renewable, resource.  
 The collapse of New England and Canada’s famed cod stocks has been 
discussed as a lesson to us all about the inability of Western countries to rationally 
deal with their environment, and has been framed as an ecological warning. It is 
important that we take what happened in the Northwest Atlantic into 
consideration in the crafting of fisheries policy, and other environmental policies, 
for that matter. In the sixteen years since the cod stocks dramatically collapsed, 
the public, the media, and government officials have expressed dismay at what 
happened, but there has been little call for real change in fisheries policy. 
Trawlers still destroy the ocean bottom of the cod’s habitat, in search of other 
species, and there is strong resistance to efforts to protect marine environments, 
from fishing as well as pollution and resource extraction. Environmentally, it is 
important that a greater effort is made to protect the few cod that are left, and their 
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environment, in hopes that their population can recover. However, social policy 
must assume that the cod will not return, and aid fishermen and coastal 
communities in transitioning to other, more stable livelihoods. And, if the lessons 
of the cod collapse are not heeded by managers of other fisheries and 
policymakers, more and more communities will share the fate of those in New 
England and Eastern Canada.  
 On an international level, fishery policy cannot be viewed as “just 
business” by the European Union or anyone else because all fisheries policies, or 
lack thereof, have inherent social and economic implications. Fisheries are not 
merely about fish and the environment, they are about people as well, and this 
important concept cannot be forgotten. In their analysis of fisheries development 
policy, Allison and Horemans (2006) emphasize again and again the importance 
of integrating all fisheries policy in Africa (and elsewhere) with broader poverty 
reduction measures and sustainable development initiatives.  Given the extreme 
importance of West African fisheries to the health of the region’s people, 
economy and social fabric, exploiting those fisheries at the expense of local 
populations is unethical and runs counter to stated African development goals of 
the EU and many other developed nations.  
 The individual countries, the EU, and the international community as a 
whole must recognize local need for fisheries resources in West Africa, and give 
that need priority, even at the expense of demanding global markets. West 
Africans should not face malnutrition and unemployment so citizens of wealthy 
nations can continue to enjoy their favorite seafood dishes. In respecting local 
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dependence on West African fisheries, if they insist on continuing to fish in West 
African waters, foreign fleets need to switch to environmentally responsible 
fishing gear and methods. Fisheries can be a renewable resource when enough 
members of important species are left in the ocean and allowed to reproduce and 
the larger ecosystem remains intact. Fisheries policy in West Africa must 
incorporate local governance structures and decision making to have any hope of 
protecting the region’s fish-reliant populations. Small-scale fisheries are not 
unregulated as national and international stakeholders assume; local governance 
structures should be considered and strengthened, not undermined, by large-scale 
agreements and policy.  
 Certainly most of the responsibility for more ethical fisheries policy lies 
with national governments and the international community, but consumers of 
seafood in the First World need to be aware of where that seafood comes from. 
Citizens who are concerned about poverty and underdevelopment in Africa would 
probably be horrified to know the source and social cost of some of their seafood. 
They should put pressure on their governments to pursue responsible fisheries 
policy in West Africa and elsewhere; fear of political disapproval can be a 
powerful force in motivating change in fisheries policy. Every can of tuna in 
American and European supermarkets bears a “dolphin safe” label, a testament to 
the fact that when pressured by consumers, governments and the fishing industry 
can be convinced to change irresponsible fishing practices. In the last few years, 
what’s going in our oceans has become more prominent in the public 
consciousness, largely because of startling articles in mainstream media, 
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including Newsweek, National Geographic, and most recently the New York 
Times, which ran a feature on the questionable actions of the European Union in 
the West African fisheries. So, there is hope that this issue will be addressed, 
however as with many other environmental issues newspaper articles and citizen 
awareness by themselves are not enough, and if we are to prevent a social, 
economic and environmental travesty in West Africa, broad changes in attitudes 
and policies will be necessary. Changing national and international fisheries 
policy will certainly meet with political and economic resistance, but the 
consequences for West Africa and many other Third World countries of 
continuing to exploit this essential resource are far too serious to continue our 
current direction.  
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GLOSSARY OF TERMS 
Common industrial fishing methods (Whitty 2006): 
Longlining: a widely used method of fishing where a line is strung over miles of 
ocean, dangling vertical lines with baited hooks. Long lines are used to catch 
swordfish, tuna, and other pelagic (open ocean) fish species, but they also snare 
sharks, seabirds, turtles, and marine mammals, in addition to other “bycatch.”  
Driftnets: monofilament nets set across tens, even hundreds of miles of ocean, 
often at depth. These nets are also indiscriminant, catching and killing a great deal 
of sea life that is thrown away as “bycatch.” Drift nets can be especially 
problematic when they are lost or abandoned because they are non-biodegradable 
and continue to catch marine life.  
Trawling: a method of fishing were a (usually weighted) net is dragged across the 
ocean floor to catch bottom dwelling species. Not only are the levels of “bycatch” 
predictably high, trawling damages the sea floor ecosystems in a manner that 
many have compared to clear-cutting forests.  
 
Maximum sustainable yield (McEvoy 1986:6):  
A hypothetical point, used in fisheries management and modeling for year where 
“fishers take exactly as many fish as the stock recruits in a season and so do not 
impair the resource’s long-term productivity. Less fishing, of course, will produce 
fewer fish. A higher level of effort, however, will also produce fewer fish in the 
long run by leaving fewer adults to breed.”  
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WRITTEN SUMMARY OF CAPSTONE PROJECT 
 
My capstone project focuses on the depletion of marine fisheries, as a 
resource, from a geographical perspective. I analyze the processes that have lead 
to fisheries collapses all over the world, as well as the governance structures, 
management strategies, and political and economic forces involved. I argue that 
overfishing is a complex process with technical and environmental as well as 
economic and political components, and that the overfishing of the world’s oceans 
is a serious issue of environmental justice. My project examines this through two 
case studies: first, the collapse of cod stocks in Newfoundland and New England 
in the 1990s after centuries of intensive fishing, and second, the currently stressed 
and declining fisheries of West Africa. In each case I discuss the social and 
economic consequences of this environmental problem and the idea that each of 
these fisheries is as much about people as much as it is about fish. In my 
concluding chapter, I discuss the parallels between these two cases (especially in 
the processes involved) and the important differences (specifically the very 
different social impacts). Finally I address the policy implications of my analysis.  
The introduction offers a brief history of fisheries, with a focus on fish as 
an important resource historically, starting with an example from Kurlansky’s 
“Cod” to show just how crucial fishing was to US history. From there I discuss 
how fisheries are unique as a resource, and how those characteristics affect their 
use, management, ownership, depletion, and conservation. Fish are living 
organisms with complex biology and behaviors, and are part of a larger, still little 
understood, ecosystem.  Therefore, a fishery encompasses not only the fish 
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themselves, but also their environment and all the factors, including humans, 
which influence their populations, and with which their fate is intertwined. This 
makes “fisheries resources” an inherently different resource than, say, coal. The 
introduction concludes with a discussion of the depletion of fisheries that has been 
going on for decades and that is currently intensifying on a global level. I make 
the case for why this matters, first generally, then within the specifics of 
environmental justice, the social element of fisheries.  
The second chapter lays out the general information and framework that 
are necessary to make the case studies meaningful. I begin by problematizing and 
dissecting the concept of overfishing, breaking it into its political and economic, 
and physical and technological components, and arguing that the simple 
explanations of overfishing offered in discussions of fisheries depletion are 
insufficient. The purpose is to show how ideas, management, and governance 
have converged to create collapses worldwide, especially in the First World, and 
how the same processes are occurring on a shorter timescale in the Third World. 
This sets up the environmental justice framework that supports the analysis of the 
Northwest Atlantic and West Africa. In this chapter I incorporate general 
discussions of power relations in management and governance, and how that 
ensures that certain groups have little say in decision making, and suffer the 
harshest consequences when a fishery becomes depleted.  
The depletion and collapse of the Northwest Atlantic cod fishery is 
extremely, perhaps excessively, well documented in many academic disciplines, 
with particular attention to the New England states in the United States and 
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Newfoundland in Canada. I discuss the specifics of this fishery and its importance 
to the region, then examine the processes that lead to its dramatic (and seemingly 
sudden) collapse in the early 1990s. In discussing the run-up to collapse I focus 
on power dynamics and who made decisions, and about the differences within the 
fishery (on-shore vs. off-shore, etc.) and who benefited and suffered from what 
policies and impacts. I also discuss what has happened since the collapse, 
focusing most on the “little guy”, the fishermen who were left without a 
livelihood or who are watching it disappear. This discussion of what happens to 
fishermen and fishing communities sets up a comparison to the situation in West 
Africa. The processes may be similar, but the human effects are different. New 
Englanders and Newfoundlanders who were reliant on the fishery have certainly 
suffered, but they weren’t and aren’t in danger of starvation. Even in today’s 
neoliberal political environment, the governments, especially Canada’s, have tried 
to help. There is no such support structure in place if and when West Africa’s 
fishery fails. 
The fourth chapter follows a similar structure to the third, to make an 
appropriate comparison. I discuss the importance of West African fisheries to 
coastal communities as a valuable source of employment, and nutrition for 
millions of Africans citizens. I look at the power relations within these nations 
and between these nations and the EU, with a focus on how these unequal power 
relations create a situation where those with the greatest stake in the future of 
these fisheries have little or no say in the governance of this resource. I then 
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reemphasize the important environmental justice implications of this situation, 
and the social and economic impact of a fishery collapse on West Africa. 
The final chapter is where the differences between the case studies are 
discussed, as well as the environmental justice implications of fisheries depletion 
more generally. I address what lessons can be drawn from this analysis, including 
the need for greater consumer awareness of the social and environmental 
implications of their seafood, and serious consideration of environmental justice 
and social issues in local, national and international fisheries governance. 
My thesis is based largely on literature review, mostly drawing on 
geographic literature, but I also draw from other academic disciplines, as well as 
government and non-profit sources, and occasionally the mainstream media.  
As fisheries decline worldwide, the effects are unevenly distributed. For 
many residents of the First World, it simply means higher prices for seafood, and 
perhaps a shift in what is available in grocery stores. However, for those who are 
economically marginalized, in the First and Third Worlds, whose livelihoods, and 
sometimes lives, depend on declining or collapsed fisheries, the over-exploitation 
of the world’s once abundant fisheries is devastating. Too often this important, 
but little discussed, social and environmental problem is dismissed as simply “too 
many fishermen catching too many fish for too long.” However as my project 
shows, fisheries governance, and depletion, is highly political, with social, 
economic, and technical components. The decline of marine fisheries is not only 
an environmental disaster; it is a social one as well, making this an important 
issue of environmental justice.  
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